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Corporate Purpose and the Separation of Powers
Benjamin T. Seymour

A BSTRACT
Despite its intense focus on inter-jurisdictional competition, corporate
law scholarship has thus far overlooked the influence of inter-branch
competition on business organizations. This Article shows how interbranch struggles for control over corporations catalyzed the advent of
modern corporate law and helped propel Delaware to its dominant
position in the market for corporate charters.
For centuries, the legislature, judiciary, and executive vied for the
decisive role in dictating the means and ends of corporations. Through the
nineteenth century, competition among the branches produced a
dysfunctional and volatile relationship between government and private
enterprise, with each branch successively assuming a leading role in
corporate oversight, only to falter under the weight of its unique structural
limitations. The resulting instability ultimately proved so intolerable as to
prompt the creation of an entirely new paradigm of liberalized corporate
codes at the dawn of the twentieth century. Delaware’s innovation of and
rigorous adherence to corporate law’s newfound separation of powers
gave it a crucial, yet previously unappreciated, edge in the competition for
corporate charters. Moreover, modern corporate law’s system of checks
and balances curbed longstanding abuses and ushered in an equilibrium
among the branches that has served as a foundation for economic growth
in the United States since.
Beyond illuminating a novel factor in Delaware’s ascendency,
corporate law’s separation of powers poses unappreciated problems and
provides preliminary solutions for the ongoing debate over corporate
purpose. A growing chorus of progressive academics and policymakers
has called on the government to impose and enforce corporations’ social
obligations. This Article offers new grounds for skepticism towards these
proposed reforms because they would jeopardize corporate law’s hardfought equilibrium among the branches by reviving the unilateralism and
dysfunction that once plagued the United States’ corporate law regime.
Accordingly, this Article contends that vesting the government with a
proactive role in imposing and enforcing corporate purpose, whether at
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the state or federal level, is ill advised. Yet this Article also provides
reform-minded progressives with a concrete framework for structuring an
expanded power to enforce corporate purpose with minimal risk to
corporate law’s separation of powers.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
Corporate law is often characterized as a branch of private law,1 yet
this description belies the fact that much of the most significant corporate
law scholarship from the past fifty years has interrogated how political
dynamics shape business organizations.2 The most prominent of these
debates concerns inter-jurisdictional competition for corporate charters.3
While many commentators have examined relationships among the

1. See KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND
PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 33 (2006) (describing the private law conception of corporate law).
2. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV.
923, 924 (1984) (examining “the important link between corporate law and political theory, that
political ideals constrain or influence the form of business organizations”).
3. For two seminal and opposing perspectives on inter-jurisdictional competition for
corporate charters, see William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of
the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
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states4—especially Delaware’s dominance in attracting charters5—another
strand of scholarship has explored the federal government’s influence on
state corporate law.6
Despite its intense focus on inter-jurisdictional competition, corporate
law scholarship has thus far overlooked the influence of inter-branch
competition on business organizations. A firsthand account from a
prominent member of Delaware’s corporate bar suggests that the state’s
practitioners and judges recognize the importance of the separation of
powers when shaping corporate law.7 But previous scholarly discussion of
the separation of powers in corporate law has amounted to little more than
a handful of analogies.8
This Article shows how inter-branch struggles for control over
corporations catalyzed the advent of modern corporate law and helped
propel Delaware to its dominant position in the market for corporate
charters. For centuries the legislature, judiciary, and executive branches

4. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1992); Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race
to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76
NW. U. L. REV. 913 (1982); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in
Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002); Jonathan R. Macey, Smith v. Van Gorkom: Insights
About C.E.O.s, Corporate Law Rules, and the Jurisdictional Competition for Corporate Charters, 96
NW. U. L. REV. 607 (2002); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation
Puzzle, 1 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985).
5. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Can Delaware Be Dethroned? Evaluating Delaware’s
Dominance of Corporate Law, in CAN DELAWARE BE DETHRONED? 1, 1 (Stephen M. Bainbridge et
al. eds., 2018) (“Delaware’s dominance of corporate law arises in the first instance from its dominant
position in the market for corporate charters. According to the Delaware Division of Corporations, as
of April 2016, more than half of all public corporations were incorporated in Delaware, including 64
percent of Fortune 500 companies.”); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or
Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 555
(2002) (“Delaware’s dominant position is far stronger . . . than has been previously recognized.”).
6. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of
Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573 (2005); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 588 (2003).
7. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1757 (2006) (recounting how Delaware judges and the drafters of its corporate
code rarely communicate because they “[r]ecogniz[e] the importance of the separation of coequal
branches of government”).
8. See Cary Coglianese, Legitimacy and Corporate Governance, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 159, 162
(2007) (analogizing the relationship among CEOs, boards of directors, and shareholders to a
“separation of powers”); see also Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate
Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1431 n.238 (2008) (same, but remarking “such comparisons ought not be
pushed too far—principally due to the radically differing postures and legitimacy of these institutions
in articulating the social good and orienting their conduct toward it”); Timothy K. Kuhner, The
Separation of Business and State, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2370–73 (2007) (discussing the separation
of powers as a model for curbing corporate political expenditures).
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vied for the decisive role in dictating the means and ends of corporations.9
Through the nineteenth century, competition among the branches
produced a dysfunctional and volatile relationship between government
and private enterprise, with each branch successively assuming a leading
role in corporate oversight, only to falter under the weight of its unique
structural limitations.10 The resulting instability ultimately proved so
intolerable as to prompt the creation of an entirely new paradigm of
liberalized corporate codes by the dawn of the twentieth century.11
Delaware’s innovation of and rigorous adherence to corporate law’s
newfound separation of powers gave it a crucial, yet previously
unappreciated, edge in the competition for corporate charters.12 Moreover,
modern corporate law’s system of checks and balances curbed
longstanding abuses and ushered in an equilibrium among the branches13
that has served as a foundation for economic growth in the United States
ever since.14
Beyond illuminating a novel factor in Delaware’s ascendency,
corporate law’s separation of powers poses unappreciated problems and
provides preliminary solutions for the ongoing debate over corporate
purpose. The proper ends of corporations, whether purely to promote
shareholder value or instead enhance stakeholder welfare, transformed
from a perennial subject of academic theory15 into a major policy issue in

9. See infra Section II.A.
10. See infra Sections II.B–II.D.
11. See infra Section III.A.
12. See infra notes 234–238, 247–266 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part III.
14. Cf. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate
Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 620 (2006) (“[E]quilibrium prevails in the charter market,
following from Delaware’s successful pursuit of an evolutionarily stable strategy to maximize rents
from the sale of charters. The strategy, first followed by New Jersey, caused a radical change in
corporate law in the late nineteenth century. Since then, stability has ruled.”).
15. For an influential exchange on corporate purpose, see E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are
Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate
Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932).
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recent years.16 Business executives17 and politicians18 alike have seized on
corporate purpose as a rallying cry for reform. Yet the first-order matter
of what ends corporations should serve is inevitably accompanied by the
second-order question of how to actualize that purpose in practice.19 A
growing chorus of progressive academics and policymakers has called on
the government to actively impose and enforce corporations’ broader
social purposes.20
This Article’s separation of powers framework offers new grounds for
skepticism towards these proposed reforms, because they would
jeopardize corporate law’s hard-fought equilibrium among the branches
by reviving the unilateralism and dysfunction that once plagued the United
States’ corporate law regime.21 Accordingly, this Article contends that
vesting the government with a proactive role in imposing and enforcing
corporate purpose, whether at the state or federal level, is a risk not worth
taking.22 Yet reform-minded progressives are not bound by the separation
of powers flaws of prior proposals. Thus, for those committed to greater
public intervention in corporate affairs, this Article articulates a concrete
statutory structure that revives the government’s corporate enforcement
powers with minimal risk to corporate law’s interbranch equilibrium.23
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part II surveys how
the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of the United States
16. See Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, 99
TEX. L. REV. 1309 (2021).
17. See, e.g., Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote “An
Economy That Serves All Americans,” BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019) [hereinafter, Business
Roundtable Redefines Purpose], https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefinesthe-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans (rescinding the
Business Roundtable’s prior commitment to shareholder primacy and replacing it with a
commitment to also serve stakeholder and societal interests); see also Omar Rodríguez-Vilá &
Sundar Bharadwaj, Competing on Social Purpose, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 2017,
https://hbr.org/2017/09/competing-on-social-purpose (discussing firms’ successful social purpose
strategies).
18. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Opinion, Companies Shouldn’t Be Accountable Only to
Shareholders, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2018, 7:01 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companiesshouldnt-be-accountable-only-to-shareholders-1534287687; Michael Peregrine & Charles Elson,
Biden in the Boardroom, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 6, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/12/06/biden-in-the-boardroom/.
19. The enforcement of corporate purpose has become a focus in recent scholarship. See
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain, 93 S.
CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (challenging the extent to which managers pursue the interests of
stakeholder constituencies, even when empowered to do so).
20. See infra Section IV.A.
21. See infra Section IV.B.
22. See infra notes 328–329 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 331–342 and accompanying text.
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successively arrogated primary control over corporate oversight during the
nineteenth century, resulting in dysfunction and instability. Part III
explains the revolution in corporate law that followed, as the advent of
modern corporate codes in New Jersey and Delaware led to a new
equilibrium of checks among the branches. Part IV explores the separation
of powers implications of the ongoing debate over corporate purpose,
arguing that current proposals for government enforcement of corporate
purpose would reproduce the pathologies of the pre-modern approach to
corporate law. To avoid repeating these failures, Part IV cautions against
reviving the government’s role in enforcing corporate purpose, but
provides reformers committed to government intervention with a concrete
proposal for how to enhance public oversight of corporations yet safeguard
checks and balances. A brief conclusion contextualizes the contemporary
debate over corporate purpose in the longer arc of history and celebrates
the tradition of questioning the proper role of private enterprise in
democratic society.

II. I NTER-B RANCH S TRUGGLES FOR C ORPORATE O VERSIGHT
Until the dawn of the twentieth century, corporations occupied a
precarious position in U.S. law, reflecting a deep-seated suspicion toward
their power.24 Government interventions, designed to curb the perceived
threat of corporate excess, imposed stringent restrictions on the corporate
form prior to the advent of modern corporate codes.25 While distrust of
corporations was widespread,26 the proper role of each branch in
restraining the United States’ burgeoning business organizations remained
an open question throughout the nineteenth century. This uncertainty
resulted in a protracted struggle, with each branch successively arrogating
a dominant role in defining the terms upon which corporations could exist
and operate, only to reveal how that branch’s unique structural limitations
prevented effective oversight.27

24. See Bruner, supra note 8, at 1385–86.
25. See infra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.
26. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780–1970, at 5 (1970) (discussing the “diffuse distrust of the corporate
form”).
27. See infra Sections II.B–II.D.
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A. An Inheritance of Inter-Branch Competition

The instability that defined the United States’ early relationship with
corporations reflected the conflicting precedents of English law. Since the
development of the first corporate bodies in England—the overwhelming
majority of which were municipal, ecclesiastical, and charitable28—the
various arms of the state vied to assert power over the corporate form.29
By far the foremost force in early corporate law,30 the Crown wielded
its authority over charters as an instrument of inter-branch control. The
King claimed ultimate authority to create corporations by granting
charters.31 Those who operated corporations without valid charters were
vulnerable to royal enforcement actions through the writ of quo
warranto.32 The writ, whose name means “by what authority?”,33 punished
defendants unable to prove they acted within the bounds of a royal charter
by dissolving their entity and assessing fines.34 Although kings harnessed
the writ of quo warranto to consolidate power as early as the twelfth
century,35 the most famous quo warranto suit of English history occurred
between 1671 and 1673, when King Charles II revoked the City of
London’s charter36 and governed the city by royal commission for the
following five years.37 The Attorney General justified the Crown’s
revocation power by arguing that otherwise corporate bodies would
amount to “independent commonwealths,” undermining royal
28. See W.S. Holdsworth, English Corporation Law in the 16th and 17th Centuries, 31 YALE
L.J. 382, 382 (1922) (“The largest part of the law still centered round the boroughs and various
ecclesiastical corporations sole or aggregate. But hospitals and colleges had begun to increase . . . .”).
29. See id.
30. See JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, Corporations in the American Colonies, in ESSAYS IN THE
EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 1, 6 (1917).
31. See David B. Guenther, Of Bodies Politic and Pecuniary: A Brief History of Corporate
Purpose, 9 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 1, 9 (2019).
32. See Comment, Quo Warranto and Private Corporations, 37 YALE L.J. 237, 237–38 (1927).
33. See Richard B. Allen, Mandamus, Quo Warranto, Prohibition, and Ne Exeat, 1960 U. ILL.
L.F. 102, 106 (1960).
34. See Comment, supra note 32, at 239 (“[T]he defendant if guilty was ousted and fined
. . . .”).
35. See Helen M. Cam, Book Note, 77 HARV. L. REV. 985, 985 (1964) (reviewing DONALD
W. SUTHERLAND, QUO WARRANTO PROCEEDINGS IN THE REIGN OF KING EDWARD I, 1278–94
(1963)); see also Edward Jenks, The Prerogative Writs in English Law, 32 YALE L.J. 523, 527–28
(1923) (discussing the use of quo warranto as a “royal weapon” in the thirteenth century).
36. See Holdsworth, supra note 28, at 403; Catherine Patterson, Quo Warranto and Borough
Corporations in Early Stuart England: Royal Prerogative and Local Privileges in the Central Courts,
120 ENG. HIST. REV. 879, 879–80 (2005).
37. See Howard A. Nenner, Book Review, 15 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 352, 353 (1971) (reviewing
JENNIFER LEVIN, THE CHARTER CONTROVERSY IN THE CITY OF LONDON, 1660–1688, AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES (1969)).
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sovereignty.38 But scholars have uncovered less principled motivations
behind the London case, observing that it was part of the King’s broader
strategy to pressure municipalities and thereby control the House of
Commons.39
Courts also inserted themselves in corporate affairs, imposing
significant limits on royal control. The judiciary insisted that the King
could neither alter the terms of a royal charter once granted, as this would
amount to changing the law,40 nor dissolve a corporation without a judicial
decree.41 Additionally, judges challenged the exclusivity of the Crown’s
chartering power by recognizing the validity of corporations created by
operation of the common law.42
Yet Parliament provided the more powerful check on royal authority
over corporations. Parliament intermittently chartered corporations of its
own,43 though courts defended this practice as so longstanding as to carry
the implied assent of the Crown.44 But rather than granting individual
charters, Parliament more often regulated corporations through general
acts, prescribing certain features for all future charters and setting limits
on privileges the King could confer.45
Parliamentary control over corporations reached its apogee in 1720
with the passage of the Bubble Act.46 Enacted during the South Sea
Bubble, a stock market crash precipitated by the failure of a colonial
corporation,47 the Bubble Act imposed harsh penalties on any corporation
that operated without a royal or parliamentary charter.48 With the Bubble
38. Holdsworth, supra note 28, at 383 (quoting (1682, K.B.) 8 S.T. 1039); see Nenner, supra
note 37, at 354.
39. See Nenner, supra note 37, at 354 (“The numerous dissolutions which followed in the wake
of the London case were part of a royal policy to control the composition of parliament. The borough
corporations returned a majority of the members of the House of Commons, and only if these boroughs
could be regulated did the Stuarts think that they might be assured of the composition they desired.”).
40. See Holdsworth, supra note 28, at 385.
41. See id.; see also Nenner, supra note 37, at 353 (discussing the role of the King’s Bench in
the London quo warranto case).
42. See Guenther, supra note 31, at 9.
43. Holdsworth, supra note 28, at 384; see WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR.,
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 113 (3d ed., 1988).
44. See DAVIS, supra note 30, at 6.
45. See id.; see also Holdsworth, supra note 28, at 385–86 (noting most corporate charters
were pursuant to royal authority).
46. See Henry N. Butler, General Incorporation in Nineteenth Century England: Interaction
of Common Law and Legislative Processes, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 169, 172–73 (1986).
47. KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 43, at 113.
48. Id.; Guenther, supra note 31, at 11; see also Paul G. Mahoney, Contract or Concession?
An Essay on the History of Corporate Law, 34 GA. L. REV. 873, 887 (2000) (“Thus, for the first time,
English law formally embraced the proposition that a business organization with separate legal
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Act, Parliament eclipsed the Crown as the most powerful branch in
corporate law by restricting the universe of valid charters and dictating the
terms of royal and parliamentary charters alike.49
Distance from England compounded inter-branch conflict over the
creation and oversight of corporations in the American colonies. Although
Parliament extended the Bubble Act to the colonies in 1741,50 the earliest
colonial corporations received charters directly from the Crown.51 But as
the colonies grew increasingly independent, they began granting charters
themselves, claiming to act as delegees of the Crown.52 Power struggles
soon followed, as royal governors and colonial assemblies alike asserted
that they were the proper delegees of the royal chartering power.53 The
resulting parallel system of chartering occasionally collapsed into
confrontation, as when Governor John Seymour of Maryland granted
Annapolis a municipal charter in 1708.54 In response, Maryland’s
assembly passed a resolution denying the governor’s authority to grant
charters.55 Governor Seymour retaliated by dissolving the assembly.56
When Governor Seymour reconvened the assembly, the delegates
affirmed Annapolis’s charter yet insisted on retaining a role in the creation
of corporations by modifying the charter’s terms.57
personality and transferrable shares could not be a creature of contract but must be a concession from
the state.”).
49. See Margaret Patterson & David Reiffen, The Effect of the Bubble Act on the Market for
Joint Stock Shares, 50 J. ECON. HIST. 163, 166 (1990); see also Holdsworth, supra note 28, at 384
(discussing Parliament’s plenary power over corporate charters).
50. See P.M. Vasudev, Corporate Law and Its Efficiency: A Review of History, 50 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 237, 241 (2010).
51. See DAVIS, supra note 30, at 7 (“The earliest colonial corporations . . . possessed charters
granted directly by the crown, which were issued in the same form, by the same process, and under
the same conditions as charters for corporations to operate in the British Isles.”); Guenther, supra note
31, at 15.
52. DAVIS, supra note 30, at 7 (“[A]s soon as the colonial governments had attained a slight
degree of development the great majority of American corporations were erected by grants from
colonial proprietors, governors, or assemblies, and not by letters patent issuing from the English crown
or by act of Parliament.”).
53. See id. at 9, 11–12.
54. See id. at 13.
55. See id. at 14.
56. See id.; C. Ashley Ellefson, Governor John Seymour and the Charters of Annapolis, MD.
ST. ARCHIVES 21 (2008),
https://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001/000749/pdf/am749.pdf
(“Disgusted with the delegates over their challenge to his issuing the charter as well as over their
other offensive proceedings, Seymour had had enough. On Tuesday morning he called them into the
council chamber again and dissolved the assembly after a session of only nine days.”).
57. See Ellefson, supra note 56, at 27 (describing the amended provisions and concluding
“[t]he delegates conceded Seymour’s right to issue the charter, and Seymour conceded the delegates’
right to amend and confirm it”).
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By the eve of the American Revolution, the question of each branch’s
role in overseeing corporations remained in a state of flux,58 as the
legislature, judiciary, and executive could each invoke English precedents
as entitling them to the decisive role in regulating corporate affairs. With
independence, a growing desire for access to corporations59 exacerbated
competition among the branches of the nascent United States. The
remainder of this Part explores this century-long struggle, explaining how
the successive domineering of each branch produced dysfunction and
instability.
B. Legislative Overbearance in the Early Republic
In the decades following the American Revolution, legislatures
assumed a dominant role in corporate oversight.60 But the promise of
democratic accountability in corporate affairs proved short-lived. By
1820, revolutionary hopes had given way to constitutional concerns of
aggrandizement61 and the disappointing realities of legislative rentseeking,62 partisanship,63 and impotence.64
Once independent from Britain, newly sovereign state legislatures
wielded the unquestioned power to charter and regulate corporations.65
Legislatures’ ascendency in corporate matters reflected a broader trend of
the decade following the Revolution:
In the heady flush of Revolutionary republicanism, Americans flirted
with the idea that governmental structure should be simple, allowing the
unmediated will of the people to be transmuted into public policy. . . .
Accordingly, though they to some extent separated the executive and

58. Cf. DAVIS, supra note 30, at 7.
59. See Guenther, supra note 31, at 28 (“American state legislatures in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth century proceeded to charter more business corporations than the world had ever
known.”).
60. See infra notes 65–69 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 92–96 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 107–114 and accompanying text.
65. See Jason Kaufman, Corporate Law and the Sovereignty of States, 73 AM. SOC. REV. 402,
415 (2008); Gregory A. Mark, The Court and the Corporation: Jurisprudence, Localism, and
Federalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 409 (“The sovereign power to create corporations thus devolved
from England to the former colonies, not in their confederated form, but to each of the former colonies
specifically, and within the structures of the new state governments, to the legislatures. This devolution
was so uncontroversial that one strains to find anyone who even bothers to comment that it had
happened.”).
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judicial powers from the legislature, early state constitutions provided
few institutional checks on legislative power.66

While New Jersey’s Governor attempted to charter a corporation in 1778,
the colonial practice of gubernatorial chartering soon disappeared from the
United States entirely.67 No longer burdened with the implied consent of
the executive,68 legislatures enjoyed plenary authority over corporations in
the first decades of the Early Republic.69
The Founders grappled with the necessity of corporate chartering,
since corporations developed America’s economic infrastructure70 and
attracted much-needed capital to the indebted nation.71 Under the
prevailing “mercantilist” theory of the corporation, the state created
corporations and permitted their operation solely for these public ends.72
A prominent manifestation of the mercantilist view was James Madison’s
proposal at the Constitutional Convention to authorize Congress “to grant
charters of incorporation in cases where the Public good may require them,
and the authority of a single State may be incompetent.”73 Madison argued
that the provision would encourage commerce among the states.74 James
Wilson, in a view that ultimately carried the day,75 objected to the proposal
as unnecessary, reasoning that the chartering power was implicit in the
Commerce Clause.76 With other delegates expressing fears that the power
would prove too divisive, given states’ differing approaches to

66. Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121
YALE L.J. 1672, 1703 (2012).
67. Cf. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 170 n.30 (1973).
68. See DAVIS, supra note 30, at 7.
69. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 166; Mark, supra note 65, at 411.
70. See Guenther, supra note 31, at 5 (describing the use of corporations for the “development
of local transportation, finance, and other much-needed economic infrastructure . . . at a time when
local governments lacked the resources to build such infrastructure”).
71. See Susan P. Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility: A Continuation of Willard
Hurst’s Study of Corporations, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81, 93 (1999).
72. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J.
1593, 1603 (1988).
73. JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 440 (1876).
74. Id. at 544 (“[Madison’s] primary object was, however, to secure an easy communication
between the states, which the free intercourse now to be opened, seemed to call for. The political
obstacles being removed, a removal of the natural ones, as far as possible, ought to follow.”).
75. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
76. ELLIOT, supra note 73, at 455; see Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law,
69 VAND. L. REV. 639, 646 (2016).
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incorporation,77 the proposal failed on an eight-to-three vote.78
Nevertheless, by the ratification of the Constitution, the notion that
chartering was an essential tool for economic development had taken root
among the United States’ political elite.79
Despite the developmental expediency of corporations, the Founders
disagreed over whether chartering would become an instrument of
legislative aggrandizement. By the late 1780s, constitutional reform at the
federal and state levels sought to replace legislative supremacy with a
more definite separation of powers secured by checks and balances.80
Ratification of the Constitution only bred deeper divisions, however, as
the question of legislative authority in corporate affairs crystallized into
the most contentious constitutional debate of the Early Republic: whether
Congress could charter the First Bank of the United States.81 Although
much of the controversy focused on the Necessary and Proper Clause82
and the importance of federalism,83 the Bank’s opponents also claimed that
granting this power to Congress would eviscerate the separation of
powers.84 Thomas Jefferson described the charter as an “invasion[] of the
legislature,”85 warning that allowing it:
would reduce the whole [Constitution] to a single phrase, that of
instituting a Congress with power to do whatever would be for the good
of the U.S. and as they would be the sole judges of the good or evil, it
would be also a power to do whatever evil they pleased.86

77. ELLIOT, supra note 73, at 455; see Mark, supra note 65, at 411; see also Pauline Maier,
The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation, 50 WM. & MARY Q. 51, 52 (1993) (observing
that the delegates feared including the power would jeopardize ratification).
78. ELLIOT, supra note 73, at 456; see Mark, supra note 65, at 411.
79. See JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW IN ANTEBELLUM SOCIETY: LEGAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
EXPANSION 43 (1983).
80. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 66, at 1705; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 51
(Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (“[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the
several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department
the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.”).
81. See ERIC LOMAZOFF, RECONSTRUCTING THE NATIONAL BANK CONTROVERSY: POLITICS
AND LAW IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 9 (2018); Pollman, supra note 76, at 646.
82. See, e.g., Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality of an
Act to Establish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-08-020060-0003; Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 183, 188 (2003).
83. See Hamilton, supra note 82 (discussing the Tenth Amendment).
84. See Keith Werhan, Checking Congress and Balancing Federalism: A Lesson from
Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1213, 1224 (2000).
85. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a National
Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-19-02-0051.
86. Id.
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Jefferson’s resistance to the Bank supplied skeptics around the country
with a new vocabulary for challenging legislatures’ plenary power over
corporations.87
As the Founders clashed over the long-term effects of legislative
predominance in corporate affairs, state legislatures began to exhibit their
inability to effectively oversee corporations in practice. Rent-seeking was
endemic.88 Legislatures restricted the supply of charters to enhance their
value, granting only a small fraction of charter applications.89 Outright
bribery pervaded the chartering process,90 and legislators frequently
reserved a portion of stock in newly chartered enterprises for themselves.91
Partisanship similarly undermined the effectiveness of legislative
oversight.92 By only granting charters to party allies, majority factions
cemented their political control.93 Factionalism was particularly acute in
New York, a center of early corporate law,94 where Federalist legislators
leveraged their chartering power to create a network of loyal investors.95
When the Democratic Republicans later won control of the New York

87. For an analysis of Jefferson’s impact on Jacksonian opposition to legislative authority over
corporations, see ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 307–09 (1945).
88. See Eric Hilt, Early American Corporations and the State, in CORPORATIONS AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 37, 41 (Naomi R. Lamoreuaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017).
89. See id.; Nicholas Walter, Antitrust and Corporate Law: Revisiting the Market for
Corporate Control, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 755, 766 (2013) (describing the scarcity of corporate charters
in the early nineteenth century); Naomi R. Lamoreaux & John Joseph Wallis, Economic Crisis,
General Laws, and the Mid-Nineteenth-Century Transformation of American Political Economy 3
(Nat’l Bur. of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27400, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27400.
90. See Jonathan R. Macey, Crony Capitalism: Right Here, Right Now, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 5, 7–8 (2014) (describing the Early Republic’s chartering process as “a kind of fertilizer for
cronyism, because people got these charters by paying bribes”); Nathan B. Oman, A Pragmatic
Defense of Contract Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 77, 89 (2009) (“[I]ncorporation by special charter resulted not
only in the monopolization of sectors of the economy but also in the corruption of legislatures
through bribery or other schemes designed to protect this artificial privilege.”).
91. See Eric Hilt & Jacqueline Valentine, Democratic Dividends: Stockholding, Wealth, and
Politics in New York, 1791–1826, 72 J. ECON. HIST. 332, 342 (2012); Howard Bodenhorn, Opening
Access: Banks and Politics in New York from the Revolution to the Civil War 4 (Nat’l Bur. of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 23560, 2017).
92. See Hilt, supra note 88, at 47. Ofer Eldar and Gabriel Rauterberg have recently argued that
partisanship remains a fundamental problem for corporate law. See Ofer Eldar & Gabriel Rauterberg,
Is Corporate Law Nonpartisan? (2020) (manuscript on file with author). By contrast, this Article
contends that partisanship is just one among many structural barriers to effective legislative control of
corporations that makes modern corporate law’s separation of powers so valuable.
93. See Lamoreaux & Wallis, supra note 89, at 3.
94. See Hovenkamp, supra note 72, at 1654 (describing New York as “the state with the
greatest influence on antebellum American corporate law”).
95. See Hilt, supra note 88, at 44; Brian Phillips Murphy, “A Very Convenient Instrument”:
The Manhattan Company, Aaron Burr, and the Election of 1800, 65 WM. & MARY Q. 233, 237 (2008).
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legislature, they repaid the Federalists in kind by only chartering
corporations owned by their own partisans.96
The extensive lobbying required to secure corporate charters not only
restricted their availability to elites97 but also resulted in widely divergent
terms upon which corporations could operate.98 Reducing legal restraints
was invaluable due to the onerous conditions that legislatures typically
imposed in corporate charters, including limits on how much capital the
corporation could raise; lifespan provisions, after which the corporation
needed to seek renewal of its charter; territorial restrictions on where the
corporation could operate; and prohibitions on corporate ownership of
stock in other entities or other categories of property.99 In keeping with the
mercantilist view that charters were only granted in the public interest100
and that the state was an indelible participant in any corporate venture,101
charters further stipulated exclusive corporate purposes.102
Incorporators’ lobbying for more favorable terms also illuminates a
structural impediment to legislative intervention in the affairs of individual
corporations. To change the legal status of a single corporation—whether
through an initial charter or subsequent amendment—legislatures
inevitably passed special legislation, solely applicable to a specified
group, rather than general legislation.103 Although common in the
96. See Bodenhorn, supra note 91, at 398; Hilt, supra note 88, at 47; Lamoreaux & Wallis,
supra note 89, at 3.
97. See Robert M. Ireland, The Problem of Local, Private, and Special Legislation in the
Nineteenth-Century United States, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 271, 281 (2004) (“The process of legislative
chartering also meant that often incorporation was granted only to those who possessed influence with
the legislature.”); Maier, supra note 77, at 72.
98. See Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of
Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 143 (1985); Ireland, supra note 97, at 281; Carl E.
Gershenson, The Social and Political Origins of the American Business Corporation, 1787-1861, at
28 (Mar. 2018) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University),
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/40050039/GERSHENSON-DISSERTATION-2018.pdf
(“[T]he special charter system incentivized incorporators to focus their lobbying efforts on
improving the terms of their own charter and preventing rivals from obtaining charters.”).
99. See Vasudev, supra note 50, at 246–47 tbl.2 (offering a taxonomy of common restrictions
in nineteenth-century corporate charters).
100. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 43, at 113; Guenther, supra note 31, at 30.
101. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 43, at 113–14; Hovenkamp, supra note 72, at 1595 (“The
very act of incorporation presumed state involvement.”).
102. See HURST, supra note 26, at 45 (“[L]egislation early required that corporate articles define
a limiting purpose or field of operations for the corporate enterprise. Limitation of purpose commonly
applied to corporations for trade and industry, as well as to those embarking on business of a public
utility character.”); Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of Shareholder Voting
Rights: Separation of Ownership and Consumption, 123 YALE L.J. 948, 987 (2014) (“Nineteenthcentury business corporations typically listed in their charters a relatively narrow and specific set of
corporate purposes.”).
103. Ireland, supra note 97, at 271, 281.
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nineteenth century,104 special legislation raises hackles today because it
offends the principle that like cases should be treated alike.105 In a word,
legislative oversight of corporations in the Early Republic, which
depended on favoritism and access, was unfair.106
Finally, legislatures proved impotent in ensuring the enforcement of
the rigid restrictions they imposed on corporations.107 Legislatures could
not effectively monitor and enforce charter restrictions on their own.108
The executive branch of the Early Republic likewise lacked an adequate
bureaucracy to enforce limitations on corporations.109 Without
standardized charter terms, prosecutors had to scrutinize individual
charters to determine whether a given corporate act warranted a quo
warranto suit.110 Additionally, governors and state attorneys general
frequently declined to enforce charter restrictions,111 both in protest of
legislative favoritism112 and in fear of powerful investors.113 As a result,
many of the peculiar terms that legislatures imposed on corporations had
limited practical effect.114
By 1820, legislatures’ dominant role in corporate oversight amounted
to a failed experiment, beset by constitutional concerns and legislative
dysfunction. Yet legislatures’ loss proved the judiciary’s gain. Discontent
with legislatures prompted judicial seizures of authority over corporate
affairs, in the name of protecting investors from arbitrary treatment during
the mid-nineteenth century.
104. See id. at 271 (“Until the mid- to late-nineteenth century, state legislatures mostly enacted
local, private, and special legislation, and very little general legislation.”).
105. Anthony Schutz, State Constitutional Restrictions on Special Legislation as Structural
Restraints, 40 J. LEGIS. 39, 60 (2014) (“The next bill that came before the legislature on the same
subject with the same facts had no assurance of similar treatment.”); Evan C. Zoldan, Legislative
Design and the Controllable Costs of Special Legislation, 78 MD. L. REV. 415, 437 (2019). In
Hayekian terms, the individualized treatment of special legislation is anathema to the rule of law. See
F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 75–85 (2001).
106. Cf. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 47 (1964) (arguing special legislation is
unfair).
107. See Hilt, supra note 88, at 52.
108. See HURST, supra note 26, at 40.
109. See id. (“[T]he regulatory goals set by legislatures could be achieved only through steady,
strong, capable executive or administrative effort. In the nineteenth-century situation it was almost
inevitable that we would not provide the necessary executive or administrative apparatus. From the
American Revolution we inherited a stubborn distrust of committing power to the executive.”).
110. See LOUIS HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT: PENNSYLVANIA,
1776-1860, at 262 (1948) (describing the “welter of variety and inconsistency” among special charters
“which not even the finest administrative system could have enforced”); Hilt, supra note 88, at 52.
111. Ireland, supra note 97, at 293.
112. Maier, supra note 77, at 74.
113. See Hilt, supra note 88, at 53.
114. See HURST, supra note 26, at 40; Maier, supra note 77, at 80.
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C. Judicial Usurpations in the Mid-Nineteenth Century
As the Early Republic gave way to the mid-nineteenth century, courts
responded to the deficiencies of legislative dominance in corporate
oversight by constitutionalizing investors’ rights under corporate
charters.115 Through a series of increasingly strained applications of the
Contracts Clause, the judiciary wrested control from the legislature.116 Yet
courts quickly proved just as incapable of unilateral corporate oversight as
legislatures had. Constrained by the ex-post nature of adjudication117 and
limited in their fact-finding abilities,118 judges ossified restrictions on
corporations and frustrated popular attempts at innovation.119
The judiciary took its first steps towards arrogation under the benign
guise of checking legislative infringement on the judicial function.120
Legislatures of the early nineteenth century regularly intervened in the
operations of existing corporations by amending their corporate
charters.121 But jurists and incorporators protested that charter
amendments violated the separation of powers by depriving individuals of
their property without judicial process.122
In 1819, the Supreme Court entered the fray, imposing the first major
check on legislatures’ authority over corporations in the landmark decision
of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.123 New Hampshire’s
legislature had passed a special statute altering the terms of Dartmouth
College’s charter.124 These amendments provided that the state of New
Hampshire would appoint a majority of Dartmouth’s board, effectively
transforming the college into a public institution.125 On Dartmouth’s
115. See infra notes 129–131 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 148–152 and accompanying text.
117. See Linda Meyer, “Nothing We Say Matters”: Teague and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
423, 423 (1990) (“Ordinarily, a court reaches the merits of the question brought before it and applies
its resolution to the parties, even though their dispute arose in the past. In other words, judicial
decisions are usually retroactive”).
118. See Note, Judicial Review of Congressional Factfinding, 122 HARV. L. REV. 767, 768
(2008) (“From the institutional competence perspective, the legislature’s superior capacity to collect
evidence—stemming from its committee system, larger staffs, and research arms—gives it a
comparative advantage over the judiciary in the generalized factfinding that informs legislation.”).
119. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
120. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 66, at 1762.
121. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
122. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 66, at 1756 (citing Trs. of Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5
N.C. 58, 85 (1805)).
123. 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
124. Id. at 539.
125. Id. at 539–44 (setting forth the special statute); see Simon Rosenzweig, Comment,
Corporations: Quo Warranto, 13 CORNELL L. REV. 92, 96 (1927).
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behalf, Daniel Webster contended, “By these acts, the legislature assumes
to exercise a judicial power[;] it declares a forfeiture, and resumes
franchises, once granted, without trial or hearing.”126
While the Marshall Court proved receptive to Webster’s arguments,127
the Justices’ arsenal for interfering in state affairs was conspicuously
limited. The most natural provision to capture Webster’s separation of
powers concerns, the Due Process Clause, did not apply against the
states.128 Instead, Chief Justice Marshall invoked the Contracts Clause,129
reasoning that, because Dartmouth’s charter constituted a contract with the
state,130 New Hampshire’s attempt to amend the terms of Dartmouth’s
charter amounted to unconstitutional impairment of a contract.131 Yet
Marshall also reinforced the state’s role in restricting the corporate form,
writing that as “a mere creature of law” a corporation “possesses only
those properties which the charter of its creation confers” on the entity.132
Dartmouth College marked a turning point in corporate law’s
separation of powers. Interposing the Constitution between legislatures
and investors, the Marshall Court not only tolled the death knell of direct
legislative oversight of corporations, but also insisted on the judiciary’s
right to dictate the contours of the corporate form.133 Yet Dartmouth
College’s quixotic vision of judges as the heroic protectors of investors’
rights belied the judiciary’s limited institutional capacity for corporate
oversight, due to the retroactive nature of adjudication134 and judges’ lack
of business expertise.135
Indeed, Dartmouth College threatened to ossify American corporate
law by preventing legislatures from lifting restrictions in previously

126. 17 U.S. at 579.
127. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 66, at 1766.
128. See id.
129. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts”).
130. 17 U.S. at 643–44 (Marshall, C.J.). Although Dartmouth received its charter from the
Crown, Chief Justice Marshall recognized that New Hampshire’s legislature was the successor to the
Crown for purposes of the contract. Id.; see Mark, supra note 65, at 409.
131. 17 U.S. at 655; Rosenzweig, supra note 125, at 96.
132. 17 U.S. at 636.
133. See Mark, supra note 65, at 425 (“[Dartmouth College] says that it is the Court that gets to
define what corporations are . . . .”).
134. See Note, supra note 118 and accompanying text.
135. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Constitution of Business, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 53,
72 (1988) (remarking that judges’ lack of economic expertise is a perennial problem in commercial
disputes).
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granted charters.136 Justice Story sought to avoid this problem in his
concurrence, remarking that because corporate charters were contracts,
legislatures could simply insert clauses in future charters reserving the
right to amend their terms.137 Over the following decades, reservation
clauses proliferated in charters across the country.138 Reservation clauses
remain the law in forty-nine states today.139 Despite these and other
popular reforms meant to limit judicial intervention, courts continued to
arrogate authority over corporate affairs in the decades after Dartmouth
College.140
Jacksonian backlash to legislatures’ cronyism spawned the
development of general incorporation statutes, which allowed
incorporation without a special charter.141 While these statutes led to a
dramatic increase in the number of corporations,142 they did little to stem
the tide of legislative rent-seeking, since legislatures continued to grant
special charters with more favorable terms than were available by general
incorporation.143 Special charters thus remained valuable because general
incorporation statutes imposed many of the charter restrictions common in
the Early Republic.144
136. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 43, at 112 (“The [Dartmouth College] decision evoked
much contemporary protest, because to many it seemed to imply that once a corporate charter was
granted, the corporation was beyond legislative control.”).
137. See Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 675 (Story, J., concurring).
138. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 43, at 112; Pollman, supra note 76, at 648. Delaware was
the first state to adopt a general reservation clause in 1831. See Hovenkamp, supra note 72, at 1617.
139. See Ian S. Speir, Constitutional and Statutory Reservation Clauses and Constitutional
Requirements of General Laws with Respect to Corporations: The Fifty States and the District of
Columbia (Apr. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1820868. The lone
exception is Utah. See id. at 1.
140. See Nelson F. Taylor, Evolution of Corporate Combination Law: Policy Issues and
Constitutional Questions, 76 N.C. L. REV. 687, 721–22 (1998) (describing legislative responses to
Dartmouth College and its progeny).
141. See Hamill, supra note 71, at 101; Hovenkamp, supra note 72, at 1634.
142. See Hovenkamp, supra note 72, at 1635.
143. See Ireland, supra note 97, at 281 (“Although a number of states enacted general laws of
incorporation by the mid-nineteenth century, often these laws were not mandatory, and the influential
usually avoided them and continued to secure special acts of incorporation that granted them powers
and privileges not available through the general incorporation statute.”); Maier, supra note 77, at 76;
Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware’s General Corporation Law of 1899, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L.
249, 249–50 (1976).
144. See Butler, supra note 98, at 143; Pollman, supra note 76, at 649; Seligman, supra note
143, at 258; Vasudev, supra note 50, at 256; Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Note, Corporate Privileges for
the Public Benefit: The Progressive Federal Incorporation Movement and the Modern Regulatory
State, 77 VA. L. REV. 603, 615 (1991) (“[T]he new laws retained a number of provisions from the
previous three decades. As a general rule, the new corporate laws stipulated matters of corporate
purpose, powers of directors and officers, amendment of articles, share structure, capital requirements
and sources of dividends.”).
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As popular reforms sought to incrementally liberalize corporate
law,145 Dartmouth College’s threat of ossification began to cast a longer
shadow. States experimented with reservation clauses to preserve the
legislature’s ability to lift restrictions on existing corporations or impose
new oversight mechanisms.146 New Jersey stipulated in its general
incorporation statute that all subsequent charters would include an implicit
reservation clause;147 however, in an extension of its Contracts Clause
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court struck down this statutory provision,
concluding the session of the legislature that passed the general statute
could not bind future sessions that wished to contract for irrepealable
charters.148 Thus, to avoid ossification, states had to amend their
constitutions to include reservation clauses.149 New Jersey and many other
states did so.150
Even after states amended their constitutions to accommodate the
judiciary’s skepticism towards reservation clauses, courts continued to
frustrate legislative innovation. Applying Dartmouth College, courts held
that legislatures could not lift restrictions in corporate charters if doing so
enabled charter amendments that altered private relations among
shareholders.151 Accordingly, when corporations availed themselves of
newly permissible charter provisions, any shareholder could enjoin the
change by filing suit.152
State courts ultimately loosened this constitutional stricture in a
manner that assisted Delaware’s ascendency in the market for corporate
charters three decades later. New Jersey treated newly permissible charter

145. See Charles Y. Yablon, The Historical Race: Competition for Corporate Charters and the
Rise and Decline of New Jersey: 1880-1910, 32 J. CORP. L. 323, 332–33 n.36 (2007) (describing the
“incremental expansion of permissible corporate size, duration, privileges, and limitations on liability”
during the mid-nineteenth century).
146. See Horace Stern, The Limitations of the Power of a State Under a Reserved Right to
Amend or Repeal Charters of Incorporation, 53 U. PA. L. REV. 145, 158 (1905).
147. See Morris & E.R. Co. v. Comm’r of R.R. Tax’n, 38 N.J.L. 472, 480 (N.J. 1875).
148. New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U.S. 104, 111 (1877).
149. See id.
150. See, e.g., Hancock v. Singer Mfg. Co., 41 A. 846, 848 (N.J. 1898) (discussing this
constitutional amendment).
151. See Taylor, supra note 140, at 722.
152. See Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N.Y.R. Co., 18 N.J. Eq. 178, 183–84 (N.J. Ch. 1867)
(“[O]ne partner or corporator, however small his interest, can prevent it . . . . This rule is founded on
principle, the great principle of protecting every man and his property by contracts entered into, a
guiding principle in all right legislation, and incorporated into the constitution of the United States,
and of almost every state in the Union. And the rule is not changed because the new business or
enterprise proposed is allowed by law, or has been made lawful since the association was formed.”);
Taylor, supra note 140, at 730–32.
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amendments as an exercise of eminent domain,153 such that dissenting
shareholders enjoyed a constitutional right to appraisal and just
compensation,154 rather than an injunction. By contrast, Delaware courts
interpreted the state constitution’s reservation clause broadly to permit
corporations to opt into newly permissible charter provisions without
issue.155 Delaware was therefore able to update its corporate code without
requiring corporations that availed themselves of newly permissible
charter provisions to incur the higher transaction costs mandated in states
like New Jersey.156
The judiciary likewise arrogated a dominant role in interpreting and
implementing charter restrictions, especially those specifying corporate
purpose,157 through a strict ultra vires doctrine.158 This doctrine enabled
shareholders to void or enjoin159 acts that were beyond the enumerated
powers of a corporation’s charter.160 Although the doctrine’s rationale was
investor protection,161 this rule reduced firm value by enabling strategic
invocation of ultra vires to avoid unfavorable contracts, thereby
introducing hold-up costs between corporations and their suppliers.162
Through quixotic interventions designed to protect investors, judges
deployed the Constitution to usurp power over corporate enterprise during
153. See Taylor, supra note 140, at 734.
154. See Black v. Delaware & R. Canal Co., 24 N.J. Eq. 455, 473 (N.J. 1873); Taylor, supra
note 140, at 732.
155. See Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 142 A. 654 (Del. Ch. 1928); Taylor, supra note
140, at 922 n.970.
156. For an analysis of corporate codes as transaction cost reduction devices, see Roberta
Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J.
1521, 1596 (2005).
157. See Holdsworth, supra note 28, at 398 (describing courts’ development of “a large body of
complex rules” to implement charter restrictions in the mid-nineteenth century).
158. See DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN
CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM 52 (2005) (“In addition to the capital
requirements imposed by many states, courts enforced a long-standing judicial rule known as the ultra
vires doctrine. Under the ultra vires doctrine, corporations were prohibited from conducting any
business that was not specifically authorized in their corporate charter.”).
159. See Michael A. Schaeftler, Ultra Vires—Ultra Useless: The Myth of State Interest in Ultra
Vires Acts of Business Corporations, 9 J. CORP. L. 81, 81–82 (1983).
160. See Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 102, at 987; Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter,
Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United with Corporate Law History,
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 877, 899 (2016).
161. See SKEEL, supra note 158, at 52; Charles E. Carpenter, Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires
Be Discarded?, 33 YALE L.J. 49, 65 (1923); Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 102, at 988; Saul
Levmore, Irreversibility and the Law: The Size of Firms and Other Organizations, 18 J. CORP. L. 333,
339 (1993); Schaeftler, supra note 159, at 81.
162. See Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality
(with Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279,
1310–11 (2001).
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the mid-nineteenth century. But these increasingly complex and
implausible extensions of the Contracts Clause stymied innovation and
ossified the onerous restrictions of the Early Republic. Judicial arrogation,
much like legislatures’ prior overbearance, achieved little more than
dysfunction and discontent.
D. Executive Domination at the Turn of the Century
By the last three decades of the nineteenth century, the failure of the
legislative and judicial branches to effectively oversee corporations
created a power vacuum that the executive branch eagerly filled.163
Reviving the blunt instrument of quo warranto, attorneys general around
the nation wielded unchecked power to dissolve the era’s largest
corporations,164 creating the uncertainty and instability that ultimately
catalyzed the advent of modern corporate law.165
The United States underwent an unprecedented economic
consolidation following the Civil War.166 Firms’ vertical and horizontal
expansion167 reduced prices168 and spurred growth.169 But legislatures—
paralyzed by rent-seeking and judicial ossification170—proved unable to
keep pace with this spurt of commercial activity. Still operating under
restrictions dating back to the Early Republic, the vast enterprises of the
Gilded Age were in near-constant violation of their charters.171 Corporate
purpose provisions proscribed vertical expansion into new lines of
business.172 Prohibitions on corporations holding stock in other firms
outlawed parent-subsidiary structures.173 To circumvent this restriction,
163. See infra notes 177–181 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 180–182 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 193–197 and accompanying text.
166. See Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2008)
(discussing “postbellum economic expansion”); Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate
Chartermongering, 1875–1929, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 677, 678 (1989); Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The
Problem of Bigness: From Standard Oil to Google, 33 J. ECON. PERSP. 94, 96 (2019).
167. See, e.g., Elizabeth Granitz & Benjamin Klein, Monopolization by “Raising Rivals’
Costs”: The Standard Oil Case, 39 J.L. & ECON. 1, 45 (1996) (discussing Standard Oil’s vertical and
horizontal expansion).
168. See Lamoreaux, supra note 166, at 96.
169. See Alexander J. Field, U.S. Economic Growth in the Gilded Age, 31 J. MACROECON. 173,
177 (2009).
170. See supra Sections I.B–I.C.
171. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 63 (1991).
172. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, Federalism, and the Theory of the Firm: An
Historical Perspective, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 75, 81 (1990).
173. See Paul Nolette, Litigating the “Public Interest” in the Gilded Age: Common Law
Business Regulation by Nineteenth-Century State Attorneys General, 44 POLITY 373, 387 (2012).
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the nation’s largest businesses formed trusts,174 to which the common
owners of multiple corporations would assign their shares so the trustee
could coordinate the corporations’ activities.175 The trusts of the Gilded
Age used their newfound ability to act in concert to engage in price fixing
and other anti-competitive activities later forbidden under antitrust laws.176
Large corporations’ runaway violations of their obsolete charter
provisions devolved unfettered control over these entities from the
legislature and judiciary to the executive branch.177 Amidst a populist
backlash against the new industrial combinations,178 elected state attorneys
general seized the opportunity179 and fulfilled their constituents’ demands
by reviving the writ of quo warranto.180 Insisting the trusts’ constituent
corporations had abused their charters, attorneys general across the
country filed quo warranto suits against leading firms in a variety of
industries.181

174. See F.J. Stimson, Trusts, 1 HARV. L. REV. 132, 134–136 (1887).
175. See Hovenkamp, supra note 172; Stimson, supra note 174, at 140; Benjamin Woodring,
Quo Warranto: The Structure and Strength of a Common Law Antitrust Remedy, 96 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 187, 198 (2019).
176. See Lamoreaux, supra note 166; James May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the
Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880–1918, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 495, 510 (1987) (discussing “corporate concentration, collusion, and predation” in the
Gilded Age).
177. See Nolette, supra note 173.
178. See Camden Hutchison, Corporate Law Federalism in Historical Context: Comparing
Canada and the United States, 64 MCGILL L.J. 109, 122 (2018); Charles W. McCurdy, The Knight
Sugar Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of American Corporation Law, 1869–1903, 53 BUS.
HIST. REV. 304, 321 (1979) (“The emergence of new, threatening aggregations of private power such
as the oil, sugar, and whiskey trusts, to mention only three, unleased a thunderous outcry in the press
. . . .”); Nolette, supra note 173, at 396.
179. See Nolette, supra note 173, at 394 (“[N]early all SAGs (and indeed all SAGs bringing the
suits against the trusts . . .) were elected independently from the governors and state legislatures
. . . .”); Werner Troesken, Antitrust Regulation Before the Sherman Act: The Break-up of the Chicago
Gas Trust Company, 32 EXPLS. ECON. HIST. 109, 119 (1995).
180. See Wayne D. Collins, Trusts and the Origins of Antitrust Legislation, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2279, 2322 (2013) (“Several states responded to public demands for actions against the trusts by
initiating quo warranto proceedings to revoke the charters of domestic corporations participating as
trust members.”); Crane, supra note 166, at 14; McCurdy, supra note 178; John C. Brinkerhoff, Jr.,
Ropes of Sand: State Antitrust Statutes Bound by Their Original Scope, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 353, 371
(2017).
181. E.g., State ex rel. Crow v. Firemen’s Fund Ins. Co., 52 S.W. 595 (Mo. 1899); State ex rel.
Att’y Gen. v. Standard Oil Co., 30 N.E. 279 (Ohio 1892); People v. N. River Sugar Ref. Co., 24 N.E.
834 (N.Y. 1890); State v. Neb. Distilling Co., 46 N.W. 155, 161 (Neb. 1890); People ex rel. Peabody
v. Chic. Gas Tr. Co., 22 N.E. 798, 806 (Ill. 1889); see Hutchison, supra note 178, at 124; Troesken,
supra note 179, at 110; Laura Phillips Sawyer, US Antitrust Law and Policy in Historical Perspective
(Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 19-110, 2019), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/us-antitrust-law-andpolicy-in-historical-perspective.
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One of the most prominent quo warranto suits of the Gilded Age was
the New York Attorney General’s enforcement action against a constituent
corporation of the Sugar Trust in 1890.182 With seventy percent of the
nation’s market share, the Sugar Trust was a frequent target of the press.183
Yet, as was typical in the quo warranto proceedings of the era,184 the
prosecution’s theory rested solely on the Trust’s violation of corporate law
restrictions, rather than any competitive analysis.185 New York’s Court of
Appeals embraced the Attorney General’s facile approach, reasoning that
by delegating decision-making authority to the Trust, the defendant
corporation had unlawfully “accept[ed] from the State the gift of corporate
life only to disregard the conditions upon which it was given.”186
In the Sugar Trust case187 and every other major quo warranto suit,188
the judiciary acquiesced in executive domination by granting the harsh
remedy sought—dissolution of the defendant corporation. Upon
“corporate death,”189 the entity’s assets went into receivership and the state
wound down the firm’s affairs.190 Judicial dissolutions left closed factories
and terminated employees in their wake, as investors balked at the political

182. See Hovenkamp, supra note 172, at 80; Daniel E. Rauch, Sherman’s Missing
“Supplement”: Prosecutorial Capacity, Agency Incentives, and the False Dawn of Antitrust
Federalism, 68 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 172, 178 (2020); Woodring, supra note 175.
183. See Woodring, supra note 175, at 199; see also, e.g., The Sugar Trust, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
15, 1892, at 4,
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1892/01/15/104090654.html?pageNumber=4
(criticizing the Sugar Trust’s acquisition of independent refineries).
184. See Woodring, supra note 175 at 198 (“[R]ather than fret over the precise nature of a trust
and its ultimate legality, the state could more simply argue that a given domestic corporation did not
have the authority to give over control of its franchise . . . without delving into the hornet’s nest of the
evils of monopoly.”).
185. See Hovenkamp, supra note 172, at 80; May, supra note 176, at 512; Sawyer, supra note
181, at 5.
186. N. River Sugar Ref. Co., 24 N.E. at 840; see also id. at 841 (“Having reached that result, it
becomes needless to advance into the wider discussion over monopolies and competition and restraint
of trade and the problems of political economy.”).
187. See id. (“[I]t appears to us to have been established, that the defendant corporation has
violated its charter, and failed in the performance of its corporate duties, and that in respects so material
and important as to justify a judgment of dissolution.”).
188. See Nolette, supra note 173, at 388 (“Despite the severe nature of this remedy, SAGs
successfully initiated the dissolution of the targeted corporation in nearly all of their early quo
warranto litigation.”); see also, e.g., Karen Clay & Werner Troesken, Strategic Behavior in Whiskey
Distilling, 1887–1895, 62 J. ECON. HIST. 999, 1014 (2002) (Whisky Trust quo warranto in Illinois);
Troesken, supra note 179, at 119 (Chicago Gas Trust quo warranto in Illinois); Woodring, supra note
175, at 203 (Whisky Trust quo warranto in Nebraska).
189. N. River Sugar Ref. Co., 24 N.E. at 834.
190. See, e.g., State v. Neb. Distilling Co., 46 N.W. 155, 161 (Neb. 1890); Woodring, supra
note 175, at 188 (“Quo warranto, as applied to corporate franchises, threatened to strip a company of
its charter or certificate, and to place its assets with a receiver, winding up its business.”).
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risk of resuming former firms’ operations.191 Capital markets reeled at the
insecurity of corporate assets, with event studies of the most significant
quo warranto decisions of the era demonstrating a twenty-nine to thirtyseven percent cumulative decline in the market value of the nation’s
largest firms, regardless of their involvement in any litigation.192
Unconstrained by the legislature and judiciary, the executive branch’s
opportunism ruptured the delicate trust between states and corporations.193
As relational contracts between the state and corporation,194 charters open
investors up to the threat of government exploitation.195 To encourage
incorporation, states must credibly commit themselves to long-term
cooperation rather than short-term defection.196 Any semblance of such
commitment dissipated in the late nineteenth century as the unchecked
executive, through entrepreneurial state attorneys general, dissolved
unpopular corporations for political gain.197
By the late nineteenth century, judicial ossification and legislative
inaction resulted in an executive branch with unfettered power over
corporations.198 Ambitious state attorneys general wielded that power
opportunistically, appealing to populist constituencies by dissolving large
corporations for their non-compliance with obsolete restrictions.199 An
ensuing breakdown of trust between states and investors wreaked havoc
191. See McCurdy, supra note 178, at 339 (“[A]ttorneys general still could not be certain that
new investors would be willing to keep local factories in operation as separate and independent
concerns. The consequences of successful quo warranto actions were therefore disastrous . . . .
Employees might be thrown out of work, local entrepreneurs might leave the industry, and local
governments might lose a significant source of tax revenues.”).
192. Werner Troesken, Did the Trusts Want a Federal Antitrust Law? An Event Study of State
Antitrust Enforcement and Passage of the Sherman Act, in PUBLIC CHOICE INTERPRETATIONS OF
AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 77, 97 (J.C. Heckelman ed., 2000).
193. See Christopher Grandy, Can Government Be Trusted to Keep Its Part of a Social
Contract?: New Jersey and the Railroads, 1825–1888, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 249, 266 (1989).
194. See Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition
for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 212 (2006) (“[A] corporate charter is a relational
contract—it binds the state and firm in a multi-period relationship in which performance under the
contract is not simultaneous . . . .”).
195. See Grandy, supra note 193, at 250 (“When the state enters a contract, public choice issues
arise that frustrate incentive compatibility. Economic and political changes may lead to state
opportunism, while the powers of government as enforcer of contracts place the private party at a
disadvantage.”).
196. See Romano, supra note 194, at 235; Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in
Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709, 720–21 (1987).
197. See Nolette, supra note 173, at 375 (discussing the “entrepreneurial” character of state
attorneys general in the late nineteenth century); see also Collins, supra note 180, at 2327 (observing
quo warranto actions typically followed corporations’ closures of plants and other unpopular actions).
198. See supra notes 177–181 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 187–188 and accompanying text.
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on the United States’ capital markets and jeopardized corporations’ very
existence.200 The disequilibrium evident in the shifting centers of gravity
among the branches of government since the Early Republic had
culminated in crisis under the unchecked power of the executive. Yet out
of this instability, modern corporate law was born.

III. M ODERN C ORPORATE L AW ’ S EQUILIBRIUM
Successive domineering by each of the branches produced a costly
disequilibrium in nineteenth-century corporate law—one that ended in an
unfettered executive dissolving of some of the largest corporations in the
United States.201 But this unstable relationship between government and
enterprise catalyzed a new approach to corporate law’s separation of
powers at the dawn of the twentieth century. Modern corporate law
guarded against inter-branch arrogation and ushered in an era of stability
in American business.
This Part examines the arrival and structure of modern corporate law’s
equilibrium by exploring its two most important checks on the previously
unbridled power of the executive branch: first, enabling corporate codes
divested the executive of its ability to revoke charters of businesses too
large to comply with the strictures of pre-modern corporate law;202 and
second, the judiciary transformed from a barrier to legislative change into
a protector of the new codes’ commitment to flexibility and guardian
against executive overbearance.203
A. Legislative Checks: Modern Corporate Codes
The quo warranto actions of the late nineteenth century produced an
uproar among investors, who began to demand less restrictive corporate
laws that would accommodate consolidated enterprises and shield firms
from arbitrary treatment.204 New Jersey heeded the call, convening a
commission of business practitioners led by the corporate attorney James
Dill to draft a new corporate code responsive to the dynamism of

200. See supra notes 192–197 and accompanying text.
201. See supra Section II.D.
202. See infra Section III.A.
203. See infra Section III.B.
204. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 171, at 63–64; Hutchison, supra note 178, at 124; Yablon,
supra note 145, at 336 (“The demand for liberal corporate charters came first, and most powerfully,
from the industrial trusts, whose quasi-legal form of organization was being successfully attacked by
state attorney generals in quo warranto proceedings.”).
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contemporary commerce.205 The enactment of Dill’s statute in 1896
marked a revolution in corporate law, as New Jersey became the first state
to adopt a modern corporate code.206
New Jersey’s 1896 corporate code jettisoned the onerous restrictions
that had constrained the corporate form since the Early Republic. The code
allowed the state’s corporations to incorporate for any lawful purpose,207
own stock in other companies,208 and operate and hold annual meetings
outside the state.209 Dill’s code eliminated limits on duration,210 replacing
a prior fifty-year limit on corporate life,211 and capitalization.212 Finally,
the statute was enabling in structure, allowing incorporators to define the
corporation’s powers and create internal governance structures, rather than
reserving that authority to the state.213
Eager to avoid stringent restrictions enforced by the threat of
dissolution, firms reincorporated in New Jersey en masse.214 Critics
denounced New Jersey as a “Traitor State”215 and “Mother of Trusts”216
that coddled anticompetitive businesses.217 Indeed, many of the
corporations recently dissolved in quo warranto actions, including those

205. See Grandy, supra note 166, at 680–681; Harold W. Stoke, Economic Influences upon the
Corporation Laws of New Jersey, 38 J. POL. ECON. 551, 572 (1930).
206. See Cary, supra note 3, at 664; Grandy, supra note 166, at 680; Hamill, supra note 71, at
116; Yablon, supra note 145, at 339.
207. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 171, at 64; SKEEL, supra note 158, at 63; Stoke, supra note
205, at 572; Eldar & Rauterberg, supra note 92, at 24.
208. See SKEEL, supra note 158, at 63; Hamill, supra note 71, at 116; Hovenkamp, supra note
172, at 84; Grandy, supra note 166, at 681; Yablon, supra note 145, at 336.
209. See SKEEL, supra note 158, at 63.
210. See Collins, supra note 180, at 2329.
211. See Seligman, supra note 143, at 265.
212. See Collins, supra note 180, at 2329.
213. See Grandy, supra note 166, at 681, 685; Edward Q. Keasbey, New Jersey and the Great
Corporations, 13 HARV. L. REV. 198, 210 (1899) (discussing the New Jersey corporate code’s
commitment to the freedom of contract); Eldar & Rauterberg, supra note 92, at 24 (“New Jersey
adopted an enabling corporation law in 1896 that granted businesses wide freedom of design, including
allowing corporations to be formed for any purpose and providing managers and shareholders great
freedom in structuring their own transactions.”).
214. See Hutchison, supra note 178, at 127 (“Between 1896 and 1901, New Jersey
incorporations increased nearly 200% . . . . By 1904, all seven of financial analyst John Moody’s
‘greater industrial trusts’—the largest corporations in the country—were incorporated in New Jersey,
as were 162 of 311 ‘lesser’ (but still significant) trusts.”); Grandy, supra note 166.
215. Lincoln Steffans, New Jersey: A Traitor State, 24 MCCLURE’S MAG., Apr. 1905 at 649,
649.
216. Seligman, supra note 143, at 270.
217. See SKEEL, supra note 158, at 63; Keasbey, supra note 213; Yablon, supra note 145, at
352-53; Eldar & Rauterberg, supra note 92, at 24.
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of the Sugar Trust,218 reemerged as New Jersey corporations.219 But New
Jersey reaped the rewards of increased franchise fees,220 which produced
so much revenue that New Jersey eliminated its property tax in 1902.221
Although several states emulated New Jersey, none matched its
success in attracting charters in the first decade of the twentieth century.222
Beyond New Jersey’s first-mover advantage, the state maintained a
sterling reputation among corporate lawyers, particularly for its expert and
business-friendly judiciary.223 Nevertheless, this nascent inter-state
competition for charters led to the proliferation of modern corporate codes
throughout the country.224
Modern corporate codes provided a crucial check on executive power
by depriving prosecutors of their ability to bring quo warranto actions for
violations of obsolete and invasive restrictions on the corporate form.225
Yet the prospect of increased franchise fees and lower taxes was so
politically attractive that New Jersey’s Governor Leon Abbett supported
the state’s remarkable restructuring of corporate law’s separation of
powers.226 Inspired by calls for reform after the dissolutions of the late
nineteenth century, New Jersey’s modern corporate code established a
legislative limit on executive authority over corporations, fostering a
balance between the two branches that had eluded the United States since
the Founding.
218. See Troesken, supra note 192, at 85.
219. See Rauch, supra note 182.
220. See Collins, supra note 180, at 2331 fig.3 (documenting New Jersey’s growth in tax
revenue from franchise fees); Hutchison, supra note 178, at 127 (noting franchise fees provided “more
than 60% of the state’s total tax revenue”); Davis, supra note 144, at 618.
221. See Grandy, supra note 166, at 683 (“By 1902 New Jersey had eliminated its bonded debt
and had abolished its state property tax.”).
222. See SKEEL, supra note 158, at 64; Hutchison, supra note 178, at 128 (“A number of states,
including Delaware, Maine, South Dakota, and West Virginia, attempted to compete with New Jersey
by passing similar corporation acts and/or charging lower corporate franchise taxes.”); McCurdy,
supra note 178, at 340 (“One state after another, anxious for some of New Jersey’s lucrative franchisetax income, decided to switch rather than fight.”).
223. See Hutchison, supra note 178, at 128; Keasbey, supra note 213, at 211–12; Eldar &
Rauterberg, supra note 92, at 26.
224. See Seligman, supra note 143, at 269 (“By 1912, New Jersey had reshaped the corporate
law of virtually every state in its own image: Forty-two states, by then, permitted the organization of
corporations for ‘any lawful purpose.’ Forty-three states had abolished capital stock limitations.
Twenty-four states issued perpetual charters and in most of the rest, charter renewal had become pro
forma.”).
225. Cf. SKEEL, supra note 158, at 63 (“New Jersey permitted corporations to define their
business broadly, which diminished the significance of the ultra vires doctrine (once you’re permitted
to define your corporation as ‘doing any lawful business,’ nothing the corporation might do will be
out of bounds).”).
226. See Grandy, supra note 166, at 681; Stoke, supra note 205, at 571.
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But New Jersey’s commitment to restraining the executive ultimately
proved short-lived. By 1913, Governor Woodrow Wilson’s successful
presidential campaign made him a progressive icon in his home state.227
Wilson, like the entrepreneurial state attorneys general before him,
understood that executive action against unpopular corporations would
galvanize the electorate.228 Thus, to bolster his party’s popularity in New
Jersey, one of Wilson’s final acts as governor was to push a series of
corporate law reforms through the legislature.229 Known as the Seven
Sisters,230 these reforms threatened a return to the executive domination of
the late nineteenth century by limiting corporations’ ability to hold stock
in other firms231 and punishing violations with charter revocation.232 The
specter of an unchecked executive, capable of dissolving consolidated
enterprises for political gain, eviscerated the credibility of New Jersey’s
commitment to long-term cooperation.233
Delaware, boasting a uniquely stable separation of powers in corporate
affairs, overtook New Jersey in the decade following the Seven Sisters’
enactment and became the dominant jurisdiction in corporate charters.234
Prior to 1899, Delaware had one of the most restrictive corporate law
regimes in the United States, with severe limitations on duration, capital,
and purpose.235 Delaware began to liberalize its approach to corporations
in 1897, when it amended its constitution to prevent legislative
domineering by prohibiting incorporation by special charter and requiring
super-majorities to pass any corporate statute.236 Delaware then checked
the power of its executive branch by adopting a modern corporate code in

227. See SKEEL, supra note 158, at 65.
228. See Grandy, supra note 166, at 687, 689; Eldar & Rauterberg, supra note 92, at 25.
229. See Grandy, supra note 166, at 689.
230. See Cary, supra note 3, at 664; Seligman, supra note 143, at 270.
231. See Grandy, supra note 166, at 689; Stoke, supra note 205, at 578.
232. See Joseph F. Mahoney, Backsliding Convert: Woodrow Wilson and the “Seven Sisters,”
18 AM. Q. 71, 73 (1966) (“The first of the Seven Sisters . . . provided for the punishment of the
corporation by loss of its charter and fine, and of corporation officers by fine and/or imprisonment.”).
233. See Hutchison, supra note 178, at 128; Grandy, supra note 166, at 689 (“New Jersey had
reneged on the implicit contract with the corporations.”); Seligman, supra note 143, at 270.
234. See SKEEL, supra note 158, at 65; Cary, supra note 3, at 663–64; Pollman, supra note 76,
at 650; Christopher J. Grandy, The Economics of Multiple Governments: New Jersey Corporate
Chartermongering, 1875–1929, at 265 (May 15, 1987) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at
Berkeley) (on file with the Yale Law School library).
235. See Yablon, supra note 145, at 359 (describing Delaware’s “limitations on the duration,
amount of capital, and purposes for which a corporation could be formed.”).
236. See Eldar & Rauterberg, supra note 92, at 27.
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1899 that mimicked New Jersey’s237 so closely that Delaware courts
treated New Jersey precedents as binding when interpreting the statute.238
Additionally, Delaware’s response to judicial interventions in the midnineteenth century allowed Delaware to update its corporate code without
triggering appraisal rights for dissenting shareholders, as in New Jersey.239
These reduced transaction costs provided a long-term advantage, as
Delaware updated its corporate code hundreds of times in the following
years to keep pace with the evolving needs of business.240 Indeed,
Delaware’s frequent and often unanimous updates to its corporate code,
based on the advice of practitioners,241 remain a key contributor to
Delaware’s success today.
By 1920, Delaware was the unquestioned epicenter of American
corporate law.242 The state’s division of powers among the legislative and
executive branches succeeded where New Jersey had failed, replacing the
uncertainty of the late nineteenth century with a stable equilibrium.
B. Judicial Checks: Defusing the Dissolution Power
Delaware’s judiciary similarly established itself as a check on political
opportunism in corporate affairs. Scholars have repeatedly emphasized the
contribution of Delaware’s expert243 and non-partisan judiciary244 to the
state’s dominance in corporate charters.245 Yet commentators have thus far
237. See Cary, supra note 3, at 664; Yablon, supra note 145, at 359–60; Eldar & Rauterberg,
supra note 92, at 27.
238. Wilmington City Ry. Co. v. Peoples Ry. Co., 47 A. 245, 253 (Del. Ch. 1900); see Butler,
supra note 98, at 162 (“[T]he court reasoned that the legislature, in adopting the language of the New
Jersey statute, had intended that the courts of Delaware adopt the New Jersey courts’ construction of
the statute.”); Yablon, supra note 145, at 361.
239. See supra notes 153–156 and accompanying text.
240. See Seligman, supra note 143, at 270; Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate
Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 896 (1990) (“Delaware adopted its first
modern general corporation law in 1899. The statute has been amended hundreds of times since
then.”). New Jersey likewise amended its corporate code repeatedly in the 1890s. See Yablon, supra
note 145, at 344.
241. See Alva, supra note 240, at 899–900; Hamermesh, supra note 7, at 1755; Eldar &
Rauterberg, supra note 92, at 30.
242. See Hamill, supra note 71, at 118–19.
243. See, e.g., Alva, supra note 240, at 903; Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware
Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1078 (2000); Romano,
supra note 194, at 213.
244. See Eldar & Rauterberg, supra note 92, at 3.
245. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis,
84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 590–91 (1990); Fisch, supra note 243, at 1081; Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory
Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1923 (1998);
Romano, supra note 4, at 280.
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overlooked how Delaware’s courts check the executive’s power over
corporations, both in legal practice and as a credible commitment to
investors.246
Delaware’s judiciary is unusually insulated from the opportunistic
politics of the executive branch. The constitutional amendments of 1897
reduced gubernatorial control over judges by imposing partisan balance
requirements on the courts.247 This appointments process stands in sharp
contrast to other states, where popularly elected judges are more
vulnerable to political pressures.248
In place of the legislative-judicial conflicts of the mid-nineteenth
century, Delaware’s legislature deliberately vested the courts with
significant policy-making authority over corporate law.249 The
legislature’s adoption of an enabling code ensured private lawsuits
eclipsed executive enforcement as the primary means of policing corporate
affairs.250 Through their adjudication of private disputes and elaboration
of evolving fiduciary law doctrines, Delaware’s courts assumed a leading
role in crafting the state’s approach to corporate law and fulfilling the
legislature’s enabling mandate.251
The judiciary’s check on executive power is most evident in
Delaware’s modern approach to quo warranto. Once a fountainhead of
executive control,252 quo warranto suits became increasingly untenable as
the liberalization of corporate purpose led the majority of firms to adopt a
stated purpose of pursuing any lawful business,253 reducing the acts

246. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
247. See Hamermesh, supra note 7, at 1760; Eldar & Rauterberg, supra note 92, at 28.
248. See Hamermesh, supra note 7, at 1760; Eldar & Rauterberg, supra note 92, at 28; cf. John
A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial
Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 969 (2002) (“Separating the judiciary from the other branches of
government means little if judges are then subjected directly to the very same pressures that caused us
to mistrust executive and legislative influence in the first place.”).
249. See Fisch, supra note 243, at 1080–81.
250. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1821–22 (2006); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the
Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865, 887 (1990); Kahan & Rock,
supra note 6, at 1606.
251. See Fisch, supra note 243, at 1080–81; Hamermesh, supra note 7, at 1760.
252. See supra Section II.D.
253. See Michael A. Schaeftler, The Purpose Clause in the Certificate of Incorporation: A
Clause in Search of a Purpose, 58 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 476, 482–83 (1984) (setting forth an empirical
study “demonstrat[ing] conclusively that the overwhelming majority of corporations in most states,
particularly medium and large-sized corporations, has adopted broad, boilerplate purpose clauses or,
where available, an ‘any lawful purpose’ clause”); David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose,
10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 185 (2013) (“In fact, most business corporations use this ‘any lawful act’
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prosecutors could challenge as ultra vires.254 Accordingly, Delaware’s
Attorney General almost entirely ceased filing quo warranto actions.255
Although the Delaware Attorney General maintains the authority to
seek the dissolution of any corporation that abuses its charter,256 the few
cases in which the Attorney General has invoked this power only
underscore the judiciary’s limitations on executive intervention. Since the
enactment of Delaware’s modern corporate code, the sole targets of quo
warranto actions have been non-profit corporations with limited
purposes.257 Still, Delaware courts have not acquiesced in an executive
request to dissolve a corporation through a quo warranto proceeding since
1928.258 In the decades since, the judiciary has declined to find any abuse
of charter so egregious as to warrant dissolution.
The judiciary’s reluctance to grant dissolution in quo warranto suits
received its greatest test during the civil rights movement of the 1950s,
when the attorneys general of multiple states commenced quo warranto
proceedings against segregationist non-profits.259 The most famous of
these modern quo warranto cases arose in Illinois, where the state’s
Supreme Court ordered the dissolution of a non-profit corporation due to
its distribution of racist literature throughout Chicago.260 Delaware’s
Attorney General followed suit in 1954, filing a quo warranto action
against the National Association for Advancement of White People, a
white supremacist non-profit dedicated to segregating the state’s

language in the purpose section of their articles of incorporation.”); Fisch & Solomon, supra note 16,
at 1328–29.
254. See SKEEL, supra note 158, at 63; Fisch & Solomon, supra note 16, at 1315 (“This led
states to shift from special charters to general charters that allowed corporations to define their purpose
as engaging in any lawful purpose or business activity. This legislative transition enabled corporations
to define their purpose as engaging in any action permitted by law. As a result, the ultra vires doctrine
fell into disrepair. The consequence was that corporate purpose became undefined and effectively
meaningless, a matter we take up in the next subsection.”).
255. See Schaeftler, supra note 159, at 90–91 (offering an empirical study of quo warranto
actions). States that liberalized their corporate law to emulate New Jersey and Delaware’s success in
attracting charters similarly experienced a precipitous drop in quo warranto suits. See id.
256. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 284 (2020); see also DEL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“The General
Assembly shall, by general law, provide for the revocation or forfeiture of the charters of all
corporations for the abuse, misuse, or non-user of their corporate powers, privileges or franchises. Any
proceeding for such revocation or forfeiture, shall be taken by the Attorney-General, as may be
provided by law.”).
257. See Allen, supra note 33, at 107; Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 102, at 990–91.
258. See Southerland v. Decimo Club, 142 A. 786, 792 (Del. Ch. 1928) (dissolving a non-profit
corporation that operated for profit).
259. See Allen, supra note 33, at 107.
260. People v. White Circle League of Am., 97 N.E.2d 811, 817 (Ill. 1951).
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schools.261 Despite this abhorrent defendant, which the court found had
repeatedly urged its members to violate state law,262 the judiciary
concluded the corporation had not sufficiently abused its charter to warrant
dissolution.263 This high point of judicial skepticism toward executive
action demonstrated that even in the most heinous cases, Delaware judges
would not acquiesce in corporate dissolution at the executive’s behest.
Delaware’s courts similarly countered executive power by awarding
limited remedies in successful quo warranto cases. While charter
revocation was once granted freely, Delaware courts began treating
dissolution as a remedy of last resort after the advent of the state’s modern
corporate code.264 For example, shortly after Young, the Attorney General
filed a quo warranto action against the Fifth Ward Republican Club,
whose name and purported non-profit purpose belied its operation as a forprofit tavern in circumvention of Delaware’s blue laws.265 Although
conceding the defendant had abused its charter, the court refused to
dissolve the corporation and instead merely enjoined its illicit activities.266
Delaware’s separation of powers in corporate affairs—rooted in both
its corporate code and case law—fueled the state’s rise to its dominant
position in American corporate law. These structural protections assuaged
investors’ fears of the executive opportunism that defined the late
nineteenth century. The enabling nature of Delaware corporate law also
obviated the threat of legislative favoritism, while the cooperative
relationship between the legislature and judiciary eschewed ossification
by judicial usurpation. Thus, by the early twentieth century, Delaware
achieved what had previously eluded the United States: a stable
equilibrium among the branches over questions of corporate law.
Although uncelebrated by commentators, Delaware’s distinctive
separation of powers marks a crowning achievement of corporate law and
provided a foundation for economic growth to this day.267

261. Young v. Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of White People, 109 A.2d 29, 30 (Del. Ch. 1954).
262. Id. at 32 (“[I]t is clear that the defendant urged the use of boycott and participated actively
in an effort to bring about violation of the laws of Delaware . . .”).
263. Id.
264. See 4 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §
26:5 (3d ed., 2020).
265. See Craven v. Fifth Ward Republican Club, Inc., 146 A.2d 400, 401 (Del. Ch. 1958).
266. Id. at 402.
267. Cf. Kira Fuchs & Florian Herold, The Costs and Benefits of a Separation of Powers—An
Incomplete Contracts Approach, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 131, 154 (2011) (discussing the economic
benefits of the separation of powers generally).
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IV. T HE P ERILS OF E NFORCING C ORPORATE P URPOSE
Corporate purpose, though a canonical subject of scholarly debate,268
has recently reemerged as the most contentious issue in corporate law.269
This resurgence is largely attributable to a renewed interest in the social
obligations of corporations among business executives.270 A prominent
indicator of corporate America’s willingness to reexamine purpose arose
in 2019, when the Business Roundtable rescinded its prior statement that
shareholder wealth maximization is the sole end of corporations and
replaced it with a broader commitment to also serving stakeholder and
societal interests.271
The terms of the debate over corporate purpose are well established.
Proponents of the traditional concession view contend that because the
government grants enterprises the privilege of the corporate form,
corporations owe substantial duties to the public.272 At the other pole,
adherents of the nexus of contracts view consider corporations to be
essentially private enterprises that exist to serve the interests of
shareholders.273
Yet the first-order matter of the corporation’s purpose is inevitably
accompanied by the second-order question of how corporate purpose
should be enforced. While commentators tend to emphasize the former to
the exclusion of the latter,274 proposals to have the government actively
enforce corporations’ social obligations have quietly catalyzed a farreaching reconsideration of the relationship between corporations and the
state.275
This Part examines proposals to revive government enforcement of
corporate purpose and argues that proponents of these reforms have
268. See George A. Mocsary, Freedom of Corporate Purpose, 2016 BYU L. REV. 1319, 1320
(“Every few decades, there erupt political and academic debates over the proper nature and purpose
of the corporation.”). For two seminal contributions to this debate, see Dodd, supra note 15; Berle,
supra note 15.
269. See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 16, at 1309.
270. See id.
271. Business Roundtable Redefines Purpose, supra note 17; see William S. Laufer & Matthew
Caulfield, Wall Street and Progressivism, 37 YALE J. ON REG. BULL. 36, 47 (2019).
272. See Greenfield, supra note 162, at 1304; Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The
Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 186 (1985); Schaeftler, supra note 159, at
87.
273. See Greenfield, supra note 162, at 1291; Horwitz, supra note 272.
274. See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 16, at 1337, 1344–46 (observing that this is a problem).
275. See infra Section III.A; see also Edward B. Rock, For Whom Is the Corporation Managed
in 2020? The Debate over Corporate Purpose, 76 BUS. LAW. 363, 363 (noting this “political”
dimension of the debate over corporate purpose).
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overlooked the separation of powers ramifications of greater state
intervention. Empowering the executive or legislative branches to directly
intervene in corporate affairs would destabilize modern corporate law’s
equilibrium and invite a return to the inter-branch contestation of the
nineteenth century. Without careful checks on each branch’s power over
corporations, history shows that the aggrandizement of a single branch—
particularly the executive—can easily result, at severe economic cost.276
To preserve the equilibrium of modern corporate law, this Part cautions
against adopting any proposal for active government enforcement of
corporate purpose;277 however, for progressive reformers committed to
such government intervention, this Part offers concrete suggestions for
how to structure a renewed role for the state with minimal separation of
powers concerns.
A. Current Proposals
A growing chorus of academics, journalists, and policymakers has
called for the government once again to impose social purposes on
corporations, enforced by threat of charter revocation.278 Yet nostalgia for
the pre-modern approach to corporate oversight is hardly new. By 1936,
Roscoe Pound already advocated a return to the pre-modern regime of
aggressive quo warranto prosecutions to curb corporate excess.279 But
through a steady stream of scholarship and advocacy, this once-obscure
proposal has seized the popular imagination and crept closer to a political
reality.280
Since the 1970s,281 environmental law scholars have argued that
because regulatory approaches to pollution have proven ineffective,282 the
276. See supra Part II.
277. See Rock, supra note 275, at 394 (“[T]inkering with the law of corporate purpose threatens
to disrupt the coherence of the corporate form, a form that has been one of the great wealth-generating
innovations of the last 150 years.”).
278. See infra notes 281–293 and accompanying text.
279. Roscoe Pound, Visitatorial Jurisdiction over Corporations in Equity, 49 HARV. L. REV.
369, 376, 395 (1936).
280. Cf. The Overton Window, MACKINAC CTR. PUB. POL’Y (2019),
https://www.mackinac.org/OvertonWindow (explaining how “the Overton Window can both shift
and expand, either increasing or shrinking the number of ideas politicians can support without
unduly risking their electoral support”).
281. See Richard J. Maddigan, Quo Warranto to Enforce a Corporate Duty Not to Pollute the
Environment, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 653, 653 (1971).
282. See Thomas Linzey, Killing Goliath: Defending Our Sovereignty and Environmental
Sustainability Through Corporate Charter Revocation in Pennsylvania and Delaware, 6 DICK. J.
ENV’T L. & POL’Y 31, 35 (1997) (“The regulatory agencies and the regulations themselves have failed
to control corporate harms.”).
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executive branch should impose a social duty not to pollute on
corporations by revoking the charters of non-compliant firms.283 Many of
these commentators favorably cited nineteenth-century approaches to
corporate law as precedent for their proposals.284 Academic interest in the
preservationist possibilities of quo warranto eventually transformed into
activist strategy.285 For example, in 2011, several climate organizations
mounted a campaign to convince Delaware Attorney General Beau Biden
to revoke the charter of Massey Energy, a mining corporation with a long
record of environmental violations.286 Attorney General Biden,
undoubtedly aware of the doctrinal hurdles to quo warranto actions in
Delaware, declined to file suit.287 Yet the perception of charter revocation
as an expedient tool of corporate oversight soon spread beyond the limits
of environmental law.
Following the accounting scandals of the early 2000s,288 academics
began to call on the executive branch to revoke the charters of corporations

283. See John Christopher Anderson, Respecting Human Rights: Multinational Corporations
Strike Out, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 463, 501–02 (1999); Mitchell F. Crusto, Green Business: Should
We Revoke Corporate Charters for Environmental Violations?, 63 LA. L. REV. 175, 190 (2003);
Thomas Linzey, Awakening A Sleeping Giant: Creating A Quasi-Private Cause of Action for Revoking
Corporate Charters in Response to Environmental Violations, 13 PACE ENV’T. L. REV. 219, 278
(1995); Linzey, supra note 282, at 61; Maddigan, supra note 281, at 654; Ryan C. Drake,
Note, Corporate Responsibility and State False Claims Acts: Evaluating the Use of Qui Tam
Proceedings to Revoke the Charters of Corporate Polluters, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 267, 268–69
(2008); Mark Willis, Striking at the Heart of Corporate Polluters: Resurrecting Quo Warranto
J.
ENV’T
L.
(2006),
Proceedings
to
Revoke
Corporate
Charters,
VT .
https://web.archive.org/web/20201129105138/http://vjel.vermontlaw.edu/writing-competition/2006essays/striking-at-the-heart-of-corporate-polluters-resurrecting-quo-warranto-proceedings-to-revokecorporate-charters/.
284. See Anderson, supra note 283, at 501; Maddigan, supra note 281, at 658–59 (“The writ of
quo warranto is thus a time-tested and efficient means of enforcing the corporate duty to the public.”);
Linzey, supra note 283, at 221; Willis, supra note 283.
285. See, e.g., Nancy Rivera Brooks, Group Wants Union Oil’s Charter Revoked, L.A. TIMES
(Sep. 11, 1998, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-sep-11-fi-21521story.html; Charlie Cray, Chartering a New Course: Revoking Corporations’ Right to Exist, 23
MULTINAT’L MONITOR, Oct.–Nov. 2002, https://multinationalmonitor.org/mm2002/02oct-nov/octnov02corp1.html (describing the National Lawyer’s Guild’s efforts to revive quo warranto as a
method of corporate oversight).
286. See APPALACHIAN VOICES, DELAWARE SHOULD REVOKE THE CORPORATE CHARTER OF
THE MASSEY ENERGY COMPANY (2011), https://appvoices.org/resources/Massey-CharterRevocation-FAQ-060811.pdf; see also JEFFREY D. CLEMENTS & BILL MOYERS, CORPORATIONS ARE
NOT PEOPLE: RECLAIMING DEMOCRACY FROM BIG MONEY AND GLOBAL CORPORATIONS 139–40
(2014) (describing this campaign).
287. See CLEMENTS & MOYERS, supra note 286, at 145.
288. For an overview of the accounting scandals of the early 2000s and the ensuing backlash,
see Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to Worldcom and Beyond: Life and Crime After Sarbanes-Oxley,
81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357 (2003).
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that engaged in any kind of serious misconduct.289 Kent Greenfield, in an
influential article in the Virginia Law Review, exhorted state attorneys
general to resume quo warranto actions to punish corporate crime.290
Other commentators proposed similar enforcement tactics at the federal
level, inviting the U.S. Department of Justice to inflict the “corporate death
penalty” of charter revocation on deviant firms.291 Even popular media
outlets concurred that a return to the nineteenth-century practice of charter
revocation was overdue.292
By far the most prominent proposal to revive the government’s role in
enforcing corporations’ social purposes through the threat of charter
revocation was Senator Elizabeth Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act
(ACA).293 While Senator Warren’s bill was not enacted into law, the ACA
nevertheless represents an authoritative expression of progressive
corporate law that will almost certainly influence future reforms from the
left.294 Under the ACA, large corporations would be required to acquire
federal charters from the newly created Office of United States
Corporations within the Department of Commerce.295 The Director of the
Office would be removable at will by the President.296 Upon application
289. See, e.g., Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability:
Containing the Machine Through the Corporate Death Penalty, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 951 (2005).
290. See Greenfield, supra note 162, at 1359–60 (“[O]ne can imagine a situation in which the
practice of illegality is so engrained in the culture and fabric of a corporation that dissolution is the
only way to ensure that it will not continue.”).
291. See MARY KREINER RAMIREZ & STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, THE CASE FOR THE CORPORATE
DEATH PENALTY 224 (2017); Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61
STAN. L. REV. 271, 278 (2008); John F. Hulpke, If All Else Fails, a Corporate Death Penalty?, 26 J.
MGMT. INQ. 433, 434 (2017); Ramirez, supra note 289, at 974 (proposing a three-strikes approach);
Drew Isler Grossman, Note, Would a Corporate “Death Penalty” Be Cruel and Unusual
Punishment?, 25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 697, 711 (2016); Kyle Noonan, Note, The Case for a
Federal Corporate Charter Revocation Penalty, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 602, 606 (2012).
292. See, e.g., David Dayen, Give Wells Fargo the Corporate Death Penalty, NEW REPUBLIC
(Aug. 1, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/144144/give-wells-fargo-corporate-death-penalty;
Ron Fein, Opinion, Equifax Deserves the Corporate Death Penalty, WIRED (Oct. 20, 2017, 8:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/equifax-deserves-the-corporate-death-penalty/; Thom Hartman, It’s
Time to Bring Back the Corporate Death Penalty, SALON (Jan. 10, 2019, 11:30 AM),
https://www.salon.com/2019/01/10/its-time-to-bring-back-the-corporate-death-penalty_partner/;
Stephen Reader, What Merits the Corporate Death Penalty, WNYC (May 27, 2011),
https://www.wnyc.org/story/137299-what-merits-corporate-death-penalty/.
293. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018); see Laufer & Caulfield, supra
note 271.
294. See Stephen F. Diamond, The Myth of Corporate Governance, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan.
13,
2021),
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2021/01/13/the-myth-of-corporate-governance/
(“[The ACA] may, in light of the commitment of the Biden administration to restoring fairness in the
economy, stand a chance of passage.”).
295. S. 3348, § 3(a).
296. Id. § 3(b)(2).
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by the attorney general of any state,297 the Office would inquire into
whether a federally chartered corporation had acted beyond its social
purpose.298 If so, the Director, with approval from the Secretary of
Commerce, would revoke the corporation’s charter.299 This penalty would
be stayed for a year,300 so the corporation could seek judicial review301 and
relief from Congress.302
Scholars—including Professors Robert Hockett and Saule Omarova
of Cornell Law School—embraced Senator Warren’s proposal,303
celebrating its similarities to nineteenth-century approaches to corporate
purpose and charter revocation.304 Senator Warren herself contended the
ACA was consistent with the prevailing view for “much of U.S. history”
that “American corporations exist only because the American people grant
them charters.”305 Policy professionals at think tanks like the Roosevelt
Institute likewise lauded the ACA’s call to renew government
enforcement of corporate purpose.306
From the pages of legal scholarship to the floor of the Senate,
proposals to restore the government’s role in enforcing corporations’
social obligations by revoking the charters of non-compliant firms became
a fixture of the contemporary debate over corporate purpose. Often
explicitly, these reforms mimic the interventionist approach to corporate
297. Id. § 9(a).
298. Id. § 9(c).
299. Id.; see Carew S. Bartley, The Accountable Capitalism Act in Context and Its Implications
for Legal Ethics, 33 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 373, 391 (2020); Denise Kuprionis, Will Warren’s
Accountable Capitalism Act Help? The Answer Is No, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept.
10, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/09/10/will-warrens-accountable-capitalism-acthelp-the-answer-is-no/.
300. S. 3348, § 9(d).
301. Id. § 9(c).
302. Letter from Robert Hockett et al. to Sen. Elizabeth Warren 5 (Aug. 15, 2018),
https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Federal%20Corporate%20Charter%20Letter%20of%
20Support.pdf (“The company’s charter would then be revoked a year later—giving the company time
before its charter is revoked to make the case to Congress that it should retain its conditional charter
in the same or in modified form.”).
303. See id. at 1; Robert Hockett, Accounting for Incorporation: Part 2, L. & POL. ECON.
PROJECT (Sept. 26, 2018), https://lpeproject.org/blog/accounting-for-incorporation-part-2/.
304. See Letter from Robert Hockett et al., supra note 302, at 1–2.
305. Warren, supra note 18; see Abdurrahman Kayiklik, How Elizabeth Warren Is Reviving
the Concession Theory of the Corporation, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Nov. 1, 2019),
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/11/01/how-elizabeth-warren-is-reviving-the-concessiontheory-of-the-corporation/.
306. See Leonore Palladino & Kristina Karlsson, Towards ‘Accountable Capitalism’: Remaking
Corporate Law Through Stakeholder Governance, ROOSEVELT INST. 6–7 (Oct. 2018),
https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/RI-Towards-%E2%80%98AccountableCapitalism%E2%80%99-brief-201810.pdf.
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oversight that prevailed in the nineteenth century. But as the next Section
argues, the dysfunctional separation-of-powers dynamics of that period
underscore the perils of a reflexive return to the pre-modern regime.
B. Reasons for Doubt
Every proposal to have the government once again impose social
purposes on corporations raises the fundamental separation of powers
question of which branch will wield this authority. The successive failures
of each branch’s dominance in corporate affairs307 illustrate why
arrogation by any single branch would threaten the stability of modern
corporate law.308 Previous proposals to revive the government’s role in
imposing social purposes on corporations have simply ignored this
separation of powers problem and instead celebrated the crude cudgel of
executive enforcement. Because political opportunism remains a threat
today just as it was in the Gilded Age, the United States should not
resurrect unchecked executive power over corporations yet expect a
different result.309
Proposals to use state quo warranto proceedings to revoke corporate
charters310 strike at the heart of modern corporate law’s separation of
powers. Delaware’s doctrinal skepticism towards allegations of charter
abuse constitutes a key bonding device, whereby the state credibly
commits to refrain from exploiting investors.311 Relaxing this judicial
check on executive arrogation would raise the specter of arbitrary
treatment for prosecutors’ political gain.312 Even a marginally heightened
risk of mistreatment at the hands of a future attorney general would reduce
the value of Delaware corporations generally;313 however, history suggests
that the risk of a political shock leading an entrepreneurial attorney general
to pursue quo warranto enforcement actions to galvanize a populist
electorate is less remote than commentators apparently believe.314
Executive domination at the federal level is equally perilous. Although
appointed by the President rather than directly elected, U.S. Attorneys still
face political pressures to bolster the popularity of the governing
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
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See supra Sections II.B-II.D.
See Rock, supra note 275, at 391 (discussing the benefits of stability in corporate law).
See supra Section II.D.
See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 162, at 1359–60.
See supra Section III.B.
See supra notes 187–188 and accompanying text.
See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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administration.315 Because anti-corporate populism remains a potent force
in federal politics,316 the executive branch’s electoral incentives reward
highly publicized enforcement actions against large, unpopular
corporations.317 Moreover, political concerns are likely top of mind for the
senior Department of Justice officials who increasingly intervene in major
corporate enforcement actions.318 Vesting federal prosecutors with the
power to pursue quo warranto actions would therefore result in a
heightened risk of political opportunism, much like at the state level.
Senator Warren’s ACA carries executive domination to its logical
extreme by allowing the Department of Commerce to revoke corporate
charters unilaterally. Reducing pre-revocation protections to the mere
agreement of two political appointees319—both of whom are terminable at
will by the President and therefore subject to presidential control320—
would encourage executive opportunism. This threat of arbitrary charter
revocation at the hands of an unchecked executive would undermine the
credibility of the United States’ commitment to abstain from the
exploitation of locked-in investors, reducing the vitality of America’s
capital markets.321
The ACA’s ex-post checks from coordinate branches are similarly
inadequate. Judicial review of the Department of Commerce’s decision to

315. See Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, The Political Economy of Prosecution, 5
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 135, 136 (2009) (“At the federal level, United States Attorneys are political
appointees who often possess strong partisan loyalties.”); see also Michael W. Dolan, Political
Influence on the Department of Justice: Are the Pressures Only External?, 9 J.L. & POL. 309, 309
(1993) (“[T]he Department of Justice[‘s] decisions can be affected by Department officials doing what
they believe will be politically popular or politically rewarded.”).
316. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Purpose in a Populist Era, 98 NEB. L. REV. 543,
562 (2020); Kahan & Rock, supra note 6, at 1588–89; Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 2491, 2504 (2005) (explaining that “populist public opinion” tends to “flood through
Washington”).
317. See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2075, 2126 (2016).
318. See Nick Schwellenbach, How Corporate Lawbreakers Get a Leg up at the Justice
Department, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 12, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/11/12/how-corporate-lawbreakers-get-a-leg-up-at-the-justicedepartment/ (describing interventions by top Justice Department officials in recent corporate
prosecutions). Political influence in federal prosecutions is hardly new. See Steven G. Calabresi &
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 659 (1994)
(“Thomas Jefferson was not the first President to assert control over prosecutors. Presidential
superintendence of federal prosecution was asserted from the very beginning.”).
319. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 9(c) (2018).
320. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 79 (Alexander Hamilton),
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed79.asp (“A power over a man’s subsistence amounts to
a power over his will.”).
321. See supra notes 192–196 and accompanying text.
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revoke a charter would be nominally available under the Administrative
Procedure Act;322 however, the ACA’s scant guidance on when revocation
is warranted323 would foreclose meaningful judicial review.324 Thus, for
corporations with suspended charters, lobbying Congress would be the
only viable option.325 Unlike in most states, special legislation is
permissible at the federal level.326 But inviting large corporations to exact
special privileges from Congress would result in the rent-seeking,
partisanship, and unfairness that sullied the era of special chartering.327
Additionally, congressional rechartering of corporations dissolved by the
executive would spur unstable inter-branch competition.
Previous proposals to restore the government’s role in imposing
corporations’ social obligations through the threat of charter revocation
have unquestioningly embraced executive power. But whether at the state
or federal level, an unchecked executive would shatter modern corporate
law’s separation of powers equilibrium and prompt a return to the
dysfunctional unilateralism of the nineteenth century. In the debate
between defenders of Delaware’s current approach and progressive
reformers, both sides should heed these concerns because, as the next
Section shows, either camp can pursue their agenda without incurring
unnecessary inter-branch instability.
C. A Better Way
The best and simplest way to preserve the separation of powers
equilibrium that has fostered stability and growth in the United States’
322. S. 3348, § 9(c)(3)(A) (“A decision by the Director to grant a revocation petition under this
subsection shall be subject to judicial review under section 706 of title 5, United States Code”).
323. The ACA merely offers non-dispositive factors. See id. § 9(c)(2) (“[T]he Director shall
consider whether the United States corporation… has engaged in repeated, egregious, and illegal
misconduct that has caused significant harm to… the customers, employees, shareholders, or business
partners of the United States corporation… or… the communities in which the United States
corporation operates….” (emphasis added)).
324. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599–600 (1988) (“[E]ven when Congress has not
affirmatively precluded judicial oversight, ‘review is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a
court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of
discretion.’” (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985))); Linzey, supra note 283, at 263
(discussing the probable non-reviewability of decisions to revoke charters in the public interest); cf.
Richard A. Epstein, Elizabeth Warren, Corporate Bully, HOOVER INST. (Oct. 14, 2019),
https://www.hoover.org/research/elizabeth-warren-corporate-bully (“[T]he federal government
would have the power to revoke a charter for some undefined class of illegal activities.”).
325. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
326. See Schutz, supra note 105, at 41 (“There is no restriction on special legislation found in
the federal constitution.”).
327. See supra Section II.B.
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corporate sector for over a century is to do just that.328 Leaving in place
the checks and balances of Delaware corporate law would ensure efforts
to curb corporate excess do not devolve into arrogation by a single branch.
Regulatory interventions outside corporate law, though too plodding for
some critics,329 offer a means of confining undesirable behavior without
effecting seismic shifts in the corporate form.
But the fact that prior proposals to restore the government’s role in
enforcing corporations’ social purposes would eviscerate the salutary
separation of powers in corporate law does not mean this outcome is
inevitable. Instead, for reformers committed to expanding the
government’s authority in corporate affairs, this Section elucidates how to
do so in a manner that poses the least threat to corporate law’s inter-branch
equilibrium. Drawing on the most successful features of Delaware law, the
structure outlined in this Section synthesizes the lessons from the United
States’ history of single-branch overbearance at the hands of the
legislature and judiciary as well as the executive. As recent proposals have
primarily called for intervention at the federal level,330 this Section
envisions federal reforms, though an analogous regime could be
implemented mutatis mutandis at the state level.
Given the realities of gridlock and partisanship,331 any proposal that
requires Congress to emulate the Delaware legislature’s unanimity or
reliance on expert practitioners is bound to fail. Thus, rather than vesting
Congress with a dominant role in establishing precise rules governing
corporate purpose, reformers should have Congress enact a broad
framework for such rules but charge an independent agency with
promulgating specific regulations. A newly created, multi-member
Corporate Affairs Commission, with partisan balance requirements, would
more closely approximate the unanimity and reliance on expertise332 that
has proven crucial to the success of Delaware’s corporate code.333
Members of the Commission should enjoy for-cause firing protections to

328. See Rock, supra note 275, at 391.
329. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
331. See Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1739,
1748 (2015) (“Perhaps the most immediate effect of polarization, combined with divided government
and supermajority requirements, is congressional gridlock. Congress becomes unable to direct
agencies through enactment of substantive legislation.”).
332. Cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 531 (2010) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court has recognized the constitutional legitimacy of a justification that rests
agency independence upon the need for technical expertise.”).
333. See supra notes 240–241 and accompanying text.
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insulate them from the political pressures to engage in opportunism that
would pervade an executive agency like the Department of Commerce.334
To facilitate judicial review, the Commission’s organic statute should
specify concrete policy objectives that the Commission’s regulations must
fulfill. While the contours of these policy objectives will differ depending
on the reformer’s vision of corporate purpose, this Article submits that the
statute should require the Commission to promulgate only enabling rules,
rather than mandatory ones. The statute should then provide that these
rules must be based on the best available evidence of which approach to
corporate purpose would minimize transaction costs by providing a
majoritarian default335 corporate purpose provision. But even reformers
intent on a more restrictive statutory framework should require the
Commission to follow notice-and-comment procedures when
promulgating its regulations, to allow input from experts and stakeholders
alike. With ex-ante rules from the Commission tempered by judicial
review, corporations could more easily discern and comply with
government expectations of the purposes that undergird their charters.336
Requiring the Commission to adopt general legislative rules would also
avoid the dysfunctions of special legislation.337
The Commission’s enforcement authority should likewise be subject
to procedural protections and inter-branch checks. Rather than
empowering entrepreneurial state attorneys general to trigger mandatory
inquiries by filing complaints against corporations,338 Congress should
instruct the Commission to exercise independent discretion as to whether
enforcement is warranted based on the Commission’s expertise. To guard
against judicial usurpation, Congress should specify that the
Commission’s decision not to pursue enforcement in a particular case is
non-reviewable.339 If the Commission concludes a corporation’s violation
of binding regulations justifies enforcement, Congress should require the
334. See supra notes 319–321 and accompanying text.
335. Cf. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1591, 1611 (1999) (“Contractual gaps should be filled with the hypothetical term that most contractors
would have wanted. This majoritarian standard has great appeal and, other things being equal, we
wholeheartedly support it.”).
336. See Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. F.T.C., 482 F.2d 672, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“[T]he
availability of notice before promulgation and wide public participation in rule-making avoids the
problem of singling out a single defendant among a group of competitors for initial imposition of a
new and inevitably costly legal obligation.”).
337. See supra notes 88–106 and accompanying text.
338. See Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 9(a) (2018).
339. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (“[A]n agency’s decision not to take
enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial review under § 701(a)(2).”).
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Commission to seek relief directly in court, rather than adjudicate the
dispute in a manner that could trigger Chevron deference.340 A traditional
judicial proceeding would preserve the separation of powers arrangement
that provided a crucial check on executive power in Delaware corporate
law.341 Finally, the Commission’s organic statute should codify doctrinal
safeguards in enforcement actions by specifying that charter revocation is
always a last resort to be eschewed when a less restrictive injunction could
prevent the corporation from exceeding its purpose.342
In sum, reformers should hesitate before advocating for any proposal
that would jeopardize corporate law’s separation of powers equilibrium.
Although maintaining the prevailing balance achieved in Delaware law is
the safest way to protect modern corporate law’s hard-won achievement,
those who insist on a greater role for the government in policing corporate
purpose should follow the strictures advocated in this Section to avoid
rekindling the inter-branch competition and arrogation that afflicted
American corporate law for more than a century.

V. C ONCLUSION
This Article has analyzed a previously overlooked dimension of U.S.
corporate law—competition among the coordinate branches of
government for greater authority in corporate affairs. Grappling with the
conflicting precedents of English law, the United States swung between
successive periods in which a single branch assumed the dominant role in
corporate oversight. The resulting instability and dysfunction hindered the
development of the corporate form and culminated in the dissolution of
the nation’s largest firms at the hands of entrepreneurial prosecutors. But
the advent of modern corporate law at the turn of the century ushered in
an era of prosperity with legislative and judicial checks to assure investors
that their assets would not be opportunistically seized for the electoral gain
of political actors. This separation of powers revolution fostered an
equilibrium among the branches that has continued to this day.
But amid the raging debate over corporate purpose, a growing chorus
of academics, journalists, and politicians have advocated for greater
government involvement in imposing and enforcing corporations’ social
obligations. Ignoring the inter-branch dynamics of corporate law, these

340. For example, the Commission might otherwise proceed by formal adjudication to receive
Chevron deference. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 219 (2001).
341. See supra Section III.B.
342. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
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proposals call for a return to the executive domination that exploited
investors and roiled capital markets in the late nineteenth century. This
Article argues that corporate law’s equilibrium should not be so carelessly
cast off. The safest way to preserve the current balance among the
branches is to maintain the hard-won system of checks and balances of
Delaware law. But even reformers intent on reviving government
enforcement of corporate purpose should proceed carefully, adopting the
structure of checks and balances articulated in this Article to minimize the
risk of aggrandizement and instability.
Inter-branch stability is indispensable in U.S. corporate law precisely
because the proper role of private enterprise in a democratic society
remains an open question. Leaving room for an evolving conception of
corporate purpose prevents naïve efforts to cut off this discourse, and with
it the shifting perspectives that have enriched America’s intellectual
tradition.343 Perhaps a new consensus will render modern corporate law’s
separation of powers obsolete, as many commentators already believe to
be the case.344 Yet this Article asks that reformers pause to consider the
costly failures of single branches’ prior attempts to declare victory over
the corporate form and move on. Corporate law’s checks and balances
keep a single voice from winning out, enabling the debate over
corporations’ ends to flourish into the future.

343. See Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule,
Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 438 (2013) (“[L]aw today, by being agnostic, rightly
refrains in a free society from prematurely (if ever) foreclosing ongoing, and sometimes shifting, social
and normative debates about the proper goal(s) of corporate activity.”); Mocsary, supra note 268.
344. See supra Section IV.A.
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